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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis includes two essays which attempt to investigate what type of exchange 
rate regime is more desirable in welfare terms when there are balance sheet constraints 
in emerging market countries (EMCs).  This is accomplished through a rigorous 
welfare-based comparison of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in the context of 
different dynamic stochastic general equilibrium small open economy models which 
incorporate some characteristics designed for the emerging market environment: 
balance sheet effects, foreign currency debt, and vulnerabilities to external shocks.  
More specifically, this thesis investigates whether and how (i) the level of foreign 
currency debt and (ii) the degree of exchange rate volatility affect balance sheets and 
welfare under different exchange rate regimes.   
   Chapter 2 investigates the effects of debt levels on balance sheets and welfare.  
This chapter evaluates the welfare properties of exchange rate regimes by employing 
the model of Devereux et al. (2006).  In contrast to the „Fear of Floating‟ view 
highlighted by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), our results show that the float 
welfare-dominates the peg for a broad range of debt levels.  In addition, as the level of 
foreign currency debt rises, the welfare difference between the two regimes becomes 
wider – the float becomes more desirable.  Moreover, the results hold irrespective of 
the degree of exchange rate pass-through. 
In Chapter 3, we extend the model of the previous chapter to investigate how the 
degree of exchange rate volatility affects the choice of exchange rate regime.  The 
main feature of the extended model is to introduce an exogenous shock to the UIP 
(uncovered interest parity) condition under flexible exchange rates, which allows the 
model to generate more realistic exchange rate volatility.  Using the extended model, 
we compare the peg with several types of floats in terms of welfare.  The main 
findings are: (a) the peg welfare-dominates strict CPI-inflation targeting under plausible 
calibrations of exchange rate volatility and the welfare difference between the two 
regimes becomes larger as exchange rate volatility increases - the peg becomes more 
desirable; (b) the peg is welfare-superior to strict domestic-inflation targeting when 
exchange rate volatility is high.  The results are basically consistent with the „Fear of 
Floating‟ view. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The question of whether monetary authorities should react directly to the exchange 
rate is a matter of debate in the academic world.  Edwards (2006) and Taylor (2001) 
argue that, at least in developed countries, monetary policy rules that directly respond to 
the exchange rate are not efficient at stabilizing inflation and real output and perform 
worse than those that do not react directly to the exchange rate.  They explain that (i) 
even if the monetary policy rule has no direct reaction of interest rates to the exchange 
rate, it has an indirect reaction of interest rates to the exchange rate
1 and that (ii) 
monetary policy rules which directly respond to the exchange rate are likely to increase 
the volatility of the interest rate.  Therefore, they argue that the exchange rate should 
not be explicitly incorporated into the monetary policy rule. 
 
On the other hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Ho and McCauley (2003) and other 
empirical studies find that many monetary authorities in emerging market countries 
(EMCs) are reluctant to allow their currencies to float freely and care about exchange 
rate fluctuations because such changes could pose significant challenges in EMCs.  
This is referred to as „Fear of Floating,‟ which is highlighted by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002).  One of the main challenges is balance sheet vulnerabilities induced by 
                                                   
1
 For example, consider the case of an exchange rate depreciation.  In a standard open economy 
model, an exchange rate depreciation today would increase the level of real output and inflation in 
the future, which raises expectations of future short-term interest rates.  With a rational expectations 
model of the term structure of interest rates, the expectations of higher future short-term interest rates 
would raise long-term interest rates today.  Thus, the exchange rate depreciation would raise interest 
rates today, even though the exchange rate is not explicitly included in the monetary policy rule.  
They call this „an indirect reaction of interest rates to the exchange rate.‟ 
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currency mismatches.
2
  Since banks and non-banks in many EMCs cannot borrow 
from abroad in their own currency, they have to borrow in foreign currency.  This 
generates an accumulation of foreign currency debt which is insufficiently matched by 
their foreign currency assets (this is called „currency mismatches‟).  Under the 
circumstances, so-called „contractionary devaluations‟ occur.  A significant exchange 
rate depreciation would inflate debt servicing costs and consequently damage the value 
of their collateral or their net worth.  Then, the decline in net worth could adversely 
affect their access to capital markets and raise the risk premium substantially, which 
could reduce investment spending dramatically, thereby leading to a severe recession.
3
  
This is referred to as balance sheet effects, balance sheet constraints, or the financial 
accelerator.  Contractionary devaluations contrast with the conventional wisdom of 
expenditure switching, which argues that an exchange rate depreciation makes exports 
competitive, thereby generating expansionary effects.         
 
   In recent years, balance sheet effects coupled with foreign currency debt have 
become a focal point of interest in theoretical studies on the appropriate monetary and 
exchange rate regime for EMCs.  Recent papers incorporating balance sheet effects in 
combination with foreign currency debt include          et al. (2002, 2004), Choi 
and Cook (2004), Cook (2004), Devereux et al. (2006),         and Tchakarov 
(2007), and Gertler et al. (2007).
4
  Most of the studies develop a standard small 
open-economy model which incorporates the financial accelerator mechanism   la 
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).  The key aspect of the 
framework is that the cost of external borrowing (the risk premium) is modeled as an 
endogenous variable and is linked to balance sheets.  When firm‟s balance sheets 
deteriorate dramatically, e.g. owing to a sudden exchange rate depreciation, the risk 
premium increases substantially, thereby generating a severe recession.  Thus, the 
model succeeds in accounting for contractionary devaluations and provides a useful 
                                                   
2
 See Note 1 of Chapter 2 for other reasons. 
3
 This phenomenon was observed in the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (see Cook (2004)). 
4
 See Note 1 of Chapter 3 for other related work. 
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insight into the behavior of EMCs. 
 
   The objective of this thesis is to study what type of exchange rate regime is more 
desirable in welfare terms when there are balance sheet constraints in EMCs.  The 
thesis investigates the question by performing a rigorous welfare comparison of fixed 
and flexible exchange rate regimes in different dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
small open economy models which incorporate balance sheet effects and foreign 
currency debt. 
 
In this context, we extend the previous literature in the following two dimensions.  
First, we deal with a wide range of debt levels in order to investigate whether and how 
the degree of foreign currency debt affects balance sheets and welfare under different 
exchange rate regimes.  Second, we evaluate the welfare properties of exchange rate 
regimes by employing a model that generates more realistic exchange rate volatility.  
To the best of our knowledge, few previous studies in this field consider these two 
issues.  Regarding the former, most of the previous studies – with the noteworthy 
exception of         and Tchakarov (2007) - do not examine the welfare 
implications of various debt levels under different exchange rate regimes.  They deal 
with at most two steady-state calibrations of the debt level.
5
  Thus, they do not present 
convincing answers to the question of what type of exchange rate regime is more 
suitable for EMCs when the level of foreign currency debt is low or high.  With 
respect to the latter, since most of the existing studies assume a stable relationship 
between the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate, their models generate 
predicted exchange rate volatility that is extremely low, compared to that seen in 
historical data (log-linearizing their models, the path of the nominal exchange rate 
basically depends on the standard UIP, uncovered interest parity, condition).  
Therefore, the impact of exchange rate variability on balance sheets could be 
                                                   
5
                 (2000) consider two steady-state calibrations of the debt level.  However, 
they compare fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes by employing the welfare measure based on a 
first-order approximation method, not using a second-order accurate welfare metric. 
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underestimated in their models.  In other words, they might understate balance sheet 
effects and thus tend to underestimate balance sheet vulnerabilities.  This thesis 
attempts to fill the gaps in the existing literature. 
 
In this thesis, we conduct a quantitative analysis of exchange rate regimes.  The 
models are calibrated using standard values from the literature and some values that 
match data from East Asian emerging markets.  The second-order approximation 
method developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) is used to solve the models 
numerically.  This method allows us to obtain a second-order accurate representation 
of expected utility and to conduct a rigorous welfare evaluation of exchange rate 
regimes.  Bergin et al. (2007),         and Tchakarov (2007) and others studies 
argue that a second-order approximation method is more suitable for assessing welfare 
than a first-order approximation method, since this higher-order approximation can 
capture the effects of uncertainty on the average levels of consumption and labor and 
thus utility. 
 
   Chapter 2 focuses on the role of debt levels and examines how the degree of foreign 
currency debt affects balance sheets and welfare under different exchange rate regimes.  
The „Fear of Floating‟ view argues that the higher the level of foreign currency debt,  
the stronger the impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on balance sheets become, thus 
making flexible exchange rates less desirable.  This is because, with a large amount of 
foreign currency debt, even a small exchange rate depreciation could inflate debt 
servicing costs, which could reduce firms‟ net worth, thereby intensifying balance sheet 
vulnerabilities.  Based on this argument, the main hypothesis of this chapter is that 
fixed exchange rates are more desirable in terms of welfare, the higher the level of 
foreign currency debt.  The model used in this chapter is a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium small open economy model developed by Devereux et al. (2006).  The 
model features two production sectors (the non-traded sector and the export sector), 
sticky prices in the non-traded sector, imperfect international risk sharing, balance sheet 
effects in combination with foreign currency debt, and exogenous foreign interest rate 
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and export price shocks.  The model also includes variable exchange rate pass-through, 
which enables us to analyze its effects on monetary policy rules. 
 
The main findings of Chapter 2 are summarized as follows.  First, in contrast to 
the „Fear of Floating‟ view, the flexible exchange rate regime welfare-dominates the 
fixed exchange rate regime for a broad range of debt levels.  In addition, as the level of 
foreign currency debt rises, the welfare difference between the two regimes becomes 
wider – the float becomes more desirable.  Since by design the peg need not care 
about domestic-inflation (non-traded goods inflation), the peg generates more volatile 
domestic-inflation and hence higher price adjustment costs in the non-traded sector than 
the float.  As we elaborate in detail in Chapter. 2, the price adjustment cost induces 
output loss and reduces final-output in the non-traded sector.  Therefore, the peg yields 
lower final-output than the float – which lowers consumption (and welfare) relative to 
the float.  Second, the degree of exchange rate pass-through does not change the 
welfare ranking of the two exchange rate regimes.  However, the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through affects the welfare difference between the two regimes: the welfare 
difference between the two regimes is larger under low exchange rate pass-through than 
under full pass-through. 
 
   Chapter 3 highlights the role of exchange rate volatility and considers how the 
degree of exchange rate volatility affects the choice of exchange rate regime.  The 
„Fear of Floating‟ view argues that fixed exchange rates are more desirable in welfare 
terms, the more volatile are exchange rates.  Chapter 3 tests this argument.  This 
chapter employs an extended version of the Devereux et al. (2006) model.  The main 
feature of the extended model is to introduce a stationary and exogenous AR(1) shock 
to the UIP condition under floating exchange rates, which allows the model to generate 
more volatile exchange rates.  We regard this shock as reflecting a bias in the agent‟s 
exchange rate forecast.  On the other hand, we assume that under fixed exchange rates 
there is no bias in exchange rate forecasts, on the basis of the fact that deviations from 
UIP were substantially small in the Bretton Woods era (e.g., Kollmann, 2005).  Using 
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the extended model, we evaluate the welfare properties of the peg and several types of 
flexible exchange rate regimes (the strict CPI inflation targeting regime, the strict 
domestic-inflation targeting regime, etc.).  
 
   The results are basically consistent with the „Fear of Floating‟ view.  The primary 
findings are: (i) the peg welfare-dominates the strict CPI-inflation targeting regime 
under plausible calibrations of exchange rate volatility and the welfare difference 
between the two regimes becomes larger as exchange rate volatility increases – the peg 
becomes more desirable; (2) whether the peg is welfare-superior to the strict 
domestic-inflation targeting regime or not depends on the degree of exchange rate 
volatility – the peg is more desirable in welfare terms when exchange rate volatility is 
high; (3) the presence of balance sheet effects is very important for the welfare 
assessment of exchange rate regimes.  In the economy without balance sheet 
constraints, strict domestic-inflation targeting welfare-dominates the peg under 
plausible calibrations of exchange rate volatility.  On the other hand, in the economy 
with balance sheet constraints, the peg welfare-dominates strict domestic-inflation 
targeting when exchange rate volatility is high (as mentioned above).  The presence of 
balance sheet constraints alters the welfare ranking of the two regimes in the case of 
high exchange rate volatility. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Foreign Currency Debt and Balance 
Sheet Effects 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
It has been argued that many monetary authorities in emerging market countries 
(EMCs) are reluctant to let their currencies float freely.  As suggested by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), one of the reasons is balance sheet vulnerabilities.
1  In many EMCs, 
so-called currency mismatches exist: banks and non-banks hold a large amount of debt 
denominated in foreign currencies which is insufficiently matched by foreign currency 
assets.  Under the circumstances, a significant exchange rate depreciation would 
increase debt servicing costs and consequently reduce the value of their collateral or 
their net worth.  Then the decline in net worth could adversely affect their access to 
capital markets and raise the risk premium substantially, which could reduce investment 
spending dramatically, thereby generating macroeconomic instability.  This is referred 
to as balance sheet effects, balance sheet constraints, or the financial accelerator.   
 
Recently, research on balance sheet effects and the appropriate choice of monetary 
policy for EMCs has been explored.  Most of the studies in this field develop a 
standard small open-economy model which incorporates the financial accelerator 
                                                   
1
 In addition to balance sheet vulnerabilities, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that lack of 
credibility, acute adjustments in the current account, exchange rate pass-through, etc. could give rise 
to „fear of floating.‟ 
 Chapter 2:  Foreign Currency Debt and Balance Sheet Effects 
17 
 
mechanism   la Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).  The key 
aspect of the framework is that the cost of external borrowing (the risk premium) is 
modeled as an endogenous variable and is linked to balance sheets.  When firm‟s 
balance sheets deteriorate dramatically, e.g. owing to a sudden exchange rate 
depreciation, the risk premium increases substantially, thereby generating a severe 
recession.  Thus, the model succeeds in accounting for balance sheet effects. 
 
However, the studies do not always present the same conclusion on the appropriate 
choice of exchange rate regime.  For example,                 (2002) find that a 
flexible exchange rate regime is better than a fixed exchange rate regime in terms of 
welfare.
2
  They conduct a welfare comparison based on a quadratic loss function 
which consists of the unconditional variances of inflation, output and the real exchange 
rate.  On the other hand, Choi and Cook (2004) and Cook (2004) show that a peg is 
welfare-superior to a float.  Their welfare criteria depend on the standard deviation of 
a weighted average of representative agent‟s consumption and labour.  As suggested 
by         and Tchakarov (2007), one of the reasons for the different conclusions 
might be that the studies resort to first-order approximation techniques.          and 
Tchakarov (2007) argue that, since the welfare measure based on a first-order 
approximation depends only on variances, a log-linear approximation of model 
equations is not appropriate for assessing welfare and that a second-order 
approximation is more suitable for assessing welfare because this higher approximation 
can pick up the effects of risk on the average levels of consumption and labour and thus 
utility.
3
 
 
In addition, the above studies do not investigate how the level of foreign currency 
debt affects overall welfare and the choice of exchange rate regime.  In other words, 
they do not present clear answers to the following question: when EMCs suffer from 
                                                   
2
                 (2004), Devereux et al. (2006) and Gertler et al. (2007) also find that a flexible 
exchange rate regime is more desirable than a fixed exchange rate regime in welfare terms. 
3
 Also see Bergin et al. (2007) and Kollmann (2002, 2004) for the advantage of second-order 
approximation methods. 
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excessive levels of external debt and significant balance sheet vulnerabilities, which 
exchange rate regime is more desirable, fixed exchange rates or flexible exchange 
rates?  A theoretical exception is         and Tchakarov (2007).  They reveal the 
debt threshold above which a fixed exchange rate regime becomes welfare-superior to 
a flexible exchange rate regime.  They consider multiple steady-state calibrations of 
the debt-to-net worth (debt-to-equity) ratio and perform a welfare comparison based on 
a second-order approximation method.  They find that a peg welfare-dominates a float 
once the debt-to-net worth ratio exceeds 137%.  Their result suggests that 
implementing flexible exchange rate regimes might not be effective in EMCs with even 
moderate levels of foreign currency debt. 
 
This chapter attempts to conduct a welfare comparison of fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes which is based on a second-order accurate welfare metric.  The 
main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether and how the level of foreign 
currency debt affects welfare under different exchange rate regimes.  To this end, we 
deal with a wide range of debt-to-net worth ratios.  The model used in this chapter is a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium small open economy model developed by 
Devereux et al. (2006).
4
  Using this model, this chapter evaluates the welfare 
implications of the fixed exchange rate regime and a flexible exchange rate regime 
where the monetary authority strictly targets the inflation rate of the CPI. 
 
Although the model of Devereux et al (2006) and that of         and Tchakarov 
(2007) build on some common characteristics designed towards the emerging market 
environment, e.g. balance sheet effects, foreign currency debt, and vulnerabilities to 
external shocks, the former mainly differs from the latter in the following three 
dimensions.  First, the former develops a two-sector (non-traded sector and export 
sector) model, which assumes staggered price setting in the non-traded sector.  On the 
                                                   
4
 Devereux et al. (2006) compare fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes by using a 
second-order approximation.  However, they do not evaluate the welfare implications of various 
debt levels under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. 
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other hand, the latter‟s analysis is solely based on a one-sector model.   The former 
could offer useful insights into the behaviour of the non-traded and export sectors.  As 
we shall see in subsection 2.3.1., the financial accelerator does not have uniform 
impacts on the two sectors.  With a large stock of foreign currency debt, the economic 
downturn could become more serious in the export sector than in the non-traded sector.  
Second, the former deals with both a full exchange rate pass-through environment and 
a delayed one, while the latter considers only a full exchange rate pass-through 
environment.  The former can analyze the effects of exchange rate pass-through on 
monetary policy rules.  Third, in Devereux et al., the (steady-state) risk premium is 
assumed to be an increasing and convex function of the leverage ratio within a certain 
range.  On the other hand, in         and Tchakarov, it is assumed that the risk 
premium is an increasing and concave function of the leverage ratio.  The marginal 
effect of the leverage ratio on the risk premium is more serious with the former relative 
to the latter. 
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows.  First, under full exchange rate 
pass-through, the flexible exchange rate regime is welfare-superior to the fixed 
exchange rate regime for all debt-to-net worth ratios.  Moreover, as the debt-to-net 
worth ratio rises, the welfare difference between the two regimes becomes wider.  
This implies that flexible exchange rates are more desirable, the higher the level of 
foreign currency debt.  Since by design the peg acts so as to eliminate exchange rate 
fluctuations completely and not to directly respond to domestic-inflation (non-traded 
goods inflation), the peg generates more volatile domestic-inflation and hence higher 
price adjustment costs in the non-traded sector than the float.  As we will discuss in 
subsection 2.3.2., the price adjustment cost induces output loss and reduces final-output 
in the non-traded sector.  Therefore, the peg yields lower final-output than the float – 
which lowers consumption (and welfare) relative to the float.  
 
Second, comparing the float with the peg under low exchange rate pass-through, we 
find that the degree of exchange rate pass-through does not change the welfare ranking 
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of the two exchange rate regimes.  However, our results show that the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through affects the welfare difference between both regimes: the 
welfare difference between the two regimes is larger under low exchange rate 
pass-through than under full pass-through.  The results suggest that flexible exchange 
rates are more attractive in terms of welfare, the slower exchange rate pass-through.  
 
We also perform different robustness experiments in order to check the sensitivity 
of our main results to alternative calibrations.  The main message of this chapter is 
robust to various parameterizations of the risk premium, preferences, and the 
debt-to-net worth ratio.  Moreover, we investigate another specification of the risk 
premium and similar results are obtained.  In contrast to the „Fear of Floating‟ view 
highlighted by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), our results suggest that flexible exchange 
rates could be more desirable than fixed exchange rates in welfare terms even when 
EMCs have excessive levels of foreign currency debt and face significant balance sheet 
vulnerabilities. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Section 2.2. presents a brief description 
of the model developed by Devereux et al. (2006).  Section 2.3. provides the main 
results and Section 2.4. presents the results of different robustness experiments.  
Section 2.5. concludes. 
 
 
2.2.  The model 
 
As mentioned above, this chapter employs the model of Devereux et al. (2006).  
In this section, we present a brief description of the model.  
 
The model constructs a small open economy with households, firms, capitalists, 
foreign lenders, and the monetary authority.  Firms consist of three sets of players: 
production firms, importers, and unfinished capital goods firms.  In addition, 
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production firms, unfinished capital goods firms, and capitalists are divided into two 
sectors: the non-traded sector and the export sector.  Two final goods (the non-traded 
good and the export good) are produced by production firms in each sector using labour 
and capital.  Labour is supplied by households and capitalists, while capital is rented 
from capitalists.  Unfinished capital goods firms produce „unfinished‟ capital goods by 
using „finished‟ capital and the investment composite, and sell them to capitalists.  
Capitalists borrow money denominated in foreign currency from foreign lenders by 
offering their own net worth as collateral, purchase „unfinished‟ capital, and convert 
them into „finished‟ capital.  The monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate 
in order to peg the exchange rate or to control CPI inflation.  Taking into account a 
line of empirical evidence that EMCs tend to be very vulnerable to external shocks (e.g., 
Schaechter et al., 2000), the model incorporates the following two external shocks: 
foreign interest rate and export price shocks.   
 
2.2.1.  Households  
 
There is a continuum of measure 1 of consumers.  The representative consumer‟s 
inter-temporal lifetime utility function is given by  
       
  
  
   
   
 
   
    
  
   
   
                                                                          
 
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor,    is labour effort, and    is a composite 
consumption index defined by the following CES function: 
          
 
  
  
   
        
 
   
  
   
  
 
    
 
where ρ ( > 0) is the elasticity of substitution between non-traded and imported goods 
and a is the share of non-traded goods in the consumer price index.      and     are 
the consumption of non-traded and imported goods, respectively.  They are defined, as 
in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), by the following CES aggregate of the continuum of 
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differentiated goods:  
                  
 
 
   
   
    
 
    
                  
 
 
   
   
    
 
    
 
where i   [0,1] and λ ( > 1) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (it is 
assumed that λ is the same across the sectors).     (i) is produced by a 
monopolistically competitive production firm and     (i) is distributed by a 
monopolistically competitive importer.  The consumer price index (   ) is then: 
          
              
    
 
                                                                             
where      and     denote the prices of non-traded and imported goods, respectively.  
 
The representative consumer‟s budget constraint is given by 
                                    
  
 
         
       
       
                                                                                                            
 
where    is the nominal wage,    is the nominal exchange rate, and      (a 
constant).  Here    and    are nominal stocks of local and foreign 
currency-denominated debt, respectively.  The representative consumer can borrow 
from domestic financial markets at a given interest rate    while he can borrow abroad 
at a given interest rate   
 , which is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process.  
But, foreign borrowing is subject to a small transaction cost,   
  
 
         
 , 
where the cost is denominated in the composite consumption index and    is a 
deterministic steady-state level of net foreign debt.
5
  Finally, since households own all 
                                                   
5
 To ensure that the model is solved numerically using a second-order approximation, this small 
transaction cost is required.  Without this cost, the stocks of local and foreign debt and consumption 
would be non-stationary.  Moreover, it is assumed that households‟ foreign borrowing is not subject 
to informational problems, while foreign borrowing by capitalists is subject to informational  
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domestic firms, they receive any profits from the firms.  Assuming that export goods 
firms and unfinished capital goods firms are perfectly competitive, households receive 
profits from the non-traded sector and the import sector,   . 
 
The representative consumer‟s problem is to maximize its expected utility (Eq. 
(2.1)) with respect to                     subject to the budget constraint (Eq. 
(2.3)).  It follows that the first order conditions are: 
      
 
    
                                                                                                            
 
      
    
    
  
               
  
   
    
     
    
  
                                    
 
      
     
  
   
    
     
                                                                                       
 
Eq. (2.4) represents the labour supply condition.  Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) correspond to the 
Euler equations for foreign and domestic currency debt, respectively. 
 
2.2.2.  Production firms 
 
The production technology for a non-traded good firm i   [0,1] is given by: 
                     
       
          
                                                                     
 
The production technology for an exporter i   [0,1] is given by: 
                     
       
          
                                                       
 
α and γ are the shares of capital in each sector.  Ω is the share of household-labour.  
Production firms in the non-traded sector hire labour from households (   ) and from 
capitalists in the same sector (   
 ).  In return, capitalists in the non-traded sector earn 
wages,    
 .  Capital,    , is supplied by capitalists in the non-traded sector.  The 
                                                                                                                                         
(footnote continued) 
asymmetries (see subsection 2.2.5.). 
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export sector is entirely analogous. 
 
Cost minimization in the non-traded sector implies:  
             
   
   
                                                                                         
   
                
   
   
                                                                            
         
   
   
                                                                                                      
where      is the marginal cost,     denotes the rental rate of capital, and     is 
total output in the non-traded sector given by 
        
    
          
                                                                                  
 
Similarly, the following optimality conditions in the export sector can be derived 
from cost minimization:  
            
   
   
                                                                                            
   
               
   
   
                                                                                
         
   
   
                                                                                                         
where     is the rental rate of capital, and     is total output in the export sector 
given by 
        
    
          
                                                                                    
 
    is the unit price of the export good and also the unit production cost since the 
export sector is perfectly competitive.  It is assumed that the law of one price holds for 
export goods: 
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where    
  is the foreign currency price of the export good.  We assume that    
  is 
exogenously determined on world markets and follows a stochastic process.
6
 
  
2.2.3.  Price setting 
 
The model employs a price setting process   la Rotemberg (1982).  Production 
firms in the non-traded sector can behave as monopolistic competitors, but they must 
incur quadratic price adjustment costs in setting their prices.   
 
Firm i chooses        in order to maximize the following profit function subject 
to demand for firm i’s product,         
      
   
      : 
              
 
   
                          
   
 
 
               
        
     
                                                       
where    is the household‟s discount factor given by 
    
 
 
  
   
                                                                                                            
Since non-traded firms are owned by households, the expected profit stream needs to 
be discounted using the household‟s discount factor.  The third term inside brackets in 
Eq. (2.16) describes the price adjustment cost (denominated in the composite final 
good) and the parameter     represents the degree of nominal price rigidities.   
 
Under the assumption of symmetry, the optimal price setting rule is derived as 
              
 
   
      
   
   
  
   
   
     
 
   
     
    
                                                   
6
 We assume that    
  is the following AR(1) process: 
          
              
       
where     is the i.i.d. disturbance with the standard deviation   . 
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Importers also set their prices as monopolistic competitors and confront similar 
price adjustment costs.  Hence, the importer i‟s profit function is described in the 
identical way: 
                                 
          
   
 
 
               
        
   
 
   
 
 
where    
  denotes the unit price of the imported good in foreign currency,        
 
      
   
       is demand for importer i‟s good, and     is total demand for imports.  
We assume that    
  is exogenously determined on world markets, that is, EMCs are 
price- takers.  For simplicity,    
 , is normalised to unity.  
 
Similarly, the optimal price setting rule is given by 
             
 
   
      
  
   
   
  
   
   
     
 
   
     
    
 
   
   
   
    
  
    
   
     
   
 
     
   
                                                  
 
Here, the parameter     indicates the degree of exchange rate pass-through.  When 
     , it indicates that exchange rate pass-through is complete. 
 
2.2.4.  Unfinished capital goods firms 
 
As mentioned above, unfinished capital goods firms are perfectly competitive.  
The firms produce unfinished capital goods and sell them to capitalists.  It is assumed 
that new unfinished capital goods in the non-traded sector are produced by combining 
both the investment composite,    , and the exiting capital stock,    .  The 
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investment composite consists of the same mixture as the household‟s consumption 
basket.  The model assumes that unfinished capital goods firms incur quadratic 
adjustment costs of investment.  More specifically, the production technology is the 
following CRS (constant return to scale) function:   
         
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
     
 
where the second term inside brackets represents investment adjustment costs (    , 
a constant) and   is the depreciation rate.  
 
Since the investment composite comprises the same combination as the 
household‟s consumption basket, the price of a unit of the investment composite is   .  
Defining     as the price of an unfinished capital good and     
  as the rental rate of 
capital provided by capitalists (in the non-traded sector), the profit function of 
unfinished capital goods firms in the non-traded sector can be written as: 
            
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
               
     
 
Then, profit maximization implies: 
     
  
     
   
   
   
                                                                                         
    
         
   
   
   
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                              
 
The problem is analogous for unfinished capital goods firms in the export sector.  
Defining     as the price of an unfinished capital good and     
  as the rental rate of 
capital, the first-order conditions in the export sector are then 
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The production technology and incomplete capital depreciation imply that capital 
stocks in the two sectors evolve according to 
       
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                                       
       
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                                        
 
2.2.5.  Capitalists 
 
Regarding the behaviour of capitalists, the model closely follows the set-up of 
Bernanke et al. (1999).  Here, we focus on capitalists in the non-traded sector.
7
 
 
At the end of period t, capitalists in the non-traded sector invest in new capital, 
     , both by purchasing unfinished capital goods at price     per unit from 
unfinished capital goods firms (and then transforming them into finished capital) and 
by buying existing capital,         , at price     per unit from the domestic 
market.  It is assumed that only capitalists have access to a technology for converting 
unfinished capital goods into finished capital and that they can do it without any costs.  
But, capitalists do not have sufficient money for their investment.  Therefore, they 
need to finance their investment with their own net worth,      , and with foreign 
loans.  Then, the amount borrowed abroad (     
   is given by 
            
   
 
  
                                 
 
However, foreign borrowing is subject to agency costs owing to moral hazard.  
Each investment project faces an idiosyncratic productivity shock, ω   (0, ).  It is 
                                                   
7
 For notational simplicity, below we drop capitalist-specific indices. 
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assumed that ω is log-normally distributed and E(ω) =1.  If       is invested in, the 
total return on the investment will be                 where        is the real 
gross return on capital.  Capitalists can observe ω without any costs, while foreign 
lenders have to pay monitoring costs,   times the value of the project 
(                ), in order to observe ω.  The model assumes that capitalists and 
foreign lenders are risk neutral.  
 
Under these circumstances, the expected share of the return on capital going to 
capitalists,         , is determined as follows: 
                                      
 
     
 
     
  
 
where      is the pdf of ω.  This implies that if   is larger than a threshold level 
     , capitalists pay                     to foreign lenders and receive the 
total return net of the payment to foreign lenders, and that if   <      , they receive 
nothing.  On the other hand, the expected share of the return on capital going to 
foreign lenders,         , is  
                              
 
     
              
     
 
 
 
where          
     
 
          is the expected fraction of the return on 
capital that is used up in monitoring and      .  This means that if   > 
     , foreign lenders receive                    , and that if        , 
foreign lenders monitor the investment by paying monitoring costs and seize the whole 
yield on the investment net of the monitoring costs.  It is assumed that monitoring 
costs are denominated in the composite final good.  
 
Then, capitalists choose the threshold value       and the stock of capital       
in order to maximize their expected profits subject to the foreign lenders‟ participation 
constraint: 
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         subject to                                   
           
                          
 
The optimal financial contract condition is determined as follows:
8
 
  
                  
         
         
           
   
         
         
    
  
 
        
                       
 
Eq. (2.26) implies that, owing to informational problems, the expected gross return on 
capital,          , is greater than the opportunity cost of funds for foreign lenders, 
       
    
    
  
 .  In other words, the risk premium, 
         
       
    
    
  
 
, is imposed 
when capitalists borrow from foreign lenders.  We now consider the relationship 
between the risk premium and the amount borrowed abroad.  In deterministic steady 
state, Eq. (2.26) and the foreign lenders‟ participation constraint can be written as:  
           
 
   
        
                     
     
 
  
  
where LR denotes the leverage ratio, 
    
  
, and     is the risk premium given by  
             
      
      
     
      
      
      
                 
 
Combining both equations gives the relationship between the risk premium and the 
leverage ratio:  
                                                   
8
 See Appendix A.1. for more detailed discussions of the optimal financial contract.  The 
derivation of     ,     ,  ,      , and       is shown in Appendix A.2. 
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Figure 2.1 shows this relationship graphically: the risk premium is increasing in the 
leverage ratio and is convex within a certain range of leverage ratios.
9 
 
At the beginning of each period, capitalists collect the returns on investment and 
repay foreign debt.  Assuming that capitalists die at any time period with probability 
(   ) 10 and consume the returns on capital only when they die, their consumption 
in the non-traded sector is given by 
    
                                                                                         
 
  
   is assumed to comprise the same mix as the household‟s consumption basket.  
Recall that wages (   
 ) are earned by capitalists working in the non-traded production 
sector.
11
  Their net worth thus consists of the unconsumed fraction of the returns and 
the wages, that is,  
                              
                                                               
 
Note that the expected share of the return on capital going to capitalists,       , and 
the participation constraint for foreign lenders are expressed as follows: 
                         
   
 
                           
                                 
     
             
    
        
      
       
                                                              
                                                   
9
 Figure 2.1 coincides with the case when the standard error of the productivity shock (    is set 
at 0.217. This value (0.217) is used to calibrate a deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratio of 
200% in the baseline experiment.  The dotted line indicates a leverage ratio of 290%, which 
corresponds to a deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratio of 200% in the baseline 
experiment. 
10
 To ensure that capitalists always need to borrow, that is, capitalists cannot accumulate enough 
wealth to fully finance their investment, this assumption is required.  Capitalists who exit are 
replaced by new capitalists, so that the total population of capitalists is constant in every period. 
11
 By assuming that capitalists earn wages, new capitalists can have some funds and invest when 
they arrive. 
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where    
                           represents the amount borrowed abroad at 
the end of period t-1.  Using Eq. (2.29) - (2.30),       can be rewritten as: 
                                   
     
            
                   
 
Eq. (2.31) implies that a exchange rate depreciation, e.g. triggered by a sudden increase 
in the foreign interest rate and an unanticipated worsening of terms of trade, would 
reduce      , which could raise the risk premium due to a increase in the leverage 
ratio.  This could reduce investment, thereby causing a fall in output.  In addition, 
with a large stock of foreign currency debt, the exchange rate depreciation could further 
damage      , thereby intensifying balance sheet vulnerabilities by even more.  
Devereux et al. (2006) investigate the impact of a nominal exchange rate depreciation 
on the economy by using impulse response analysis.  Their results show that a 
nominal exchange rate depreciation, triggered by an unanticipated increase in the 
foreign interest rate, cause a fall in capitalists‟ net worth, which reduces investment and 
non-traded output by raising the risk premium.
12
   
 
Since capitalists rent their finished capital to production firms and to unfinished 
capital goods firms and capital depreciates at the rate of  , the real gross return on 
capital in the non-traded sector,       , is defined as the sum of      ,       
 , and 
          , divided by the purchase price of capital, that is, 
       
            
            
   
                                                        
 
The details of capitalists‟ behaviour in the export sector are described analogously 
(see Appendix A.3.). 
 
2.2.6.  Monetary policy rules 
 
The monetary authority manages a short-term nominal interest rate,     , which is 
                                                   
12
 See Devereux et al. (2006, Fig. 3). 
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adjusted at the end of period t.  A change in the interest rate has a direct effect on 
households‟ behaviour via Eq. (2.6).  The interest rule takes the following simple 
form: 
        
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
                                                                             
where    denotes consumer price inflation (
  
    
), and   is a deterministic 
steady-state level of CPI inflation (throughout this paper, the term „steady state‟ 
indicates the deterministic steady state).     is a nominal exchange rate target and   is 
a deterministic steady-state level of the short-term nominal interest rate.  Here,    
and    are set to unity. 
 
The monetary authority changes the short-term interest rate in response to 
consumer price inflation and the nominal exchange rate.       corresponds to 
strict CPI inflation targeting.  On the other hand,      indicates that the monetary 
authority implements a fixed exchange rate regime.  Following Bergin et al. (2007), 
Devereux et al. (2006),         and Tchakarov (2007), and Kollmann (2002, 2004), 
we assume that all monetary policy rules are completely credible.   
 
2.2.7.  Equilibrium 
 
As mentioned above, (i) price adjustment costs in the non-traded and import sectors, 
(ii) foreign borrowing costs by households, and (iii) monitoring costs by foreign lenders 
are denominated in the composite final good.  The market clearing condition for 
non-traded goods is thus 
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Eq. (2.34) implies that (i) real price adjustment costs, 
   
 
 
         
     
 
    
and 
   
 
 
         
     
  , (ii) real foreign borrowing costs, and (iii) real monitoring costs entail 
output loss since a portion of     is used up by these costs.  In other words, given    , 
an increase in these costs reduces consumption and investment, that is, it reduces 
final-output (actual-output).
13
  As indicated by Eq. (2.34), real price adjustment costs in 
the non-traded sector increase with domestic-inflation, whereas real price adjustment 
costs in the import sector increase with inflation in imported goods.  Analogously, the 
market clearing condition for imported goods is described as: 
                  
   
  
 
  
              
     
   
  
 
         
  
                   
   
 
 
         
     
 
    
 
   
 
 
         
     
   
 
               
  
 
               
  
                                               
 
The labour market must also clear.  Assuming that labour supply by capitalists is 
completely inelastic, or fixed at one for each sector,  
                                                                                                                       
         
    
         
    
 
In addition, the market clearing condition for local currency-denominated debt,   , 
must be satisfied, which means      (it is assumed that foreigners do not hold   ). 
 
                                                   
13
 Real price adjustment costs are similar to resource costs in a Calvo-type sticky price model, in 
which resource costs entail output loss.  We will deal with the resource cost in Chapter 3. 
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Equilibrium is a set of  37 sequences (   ,    ,    ,    ,   ,   
  ,   
  ,   , 
    
 ,    
    ,    ,    ,   ,    ,    ,     ,   ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    , 
   ,     
 ,     
 ,     ,     ,    ,    ,   ,    ,    ,    ,    , and   ), 
which satisfies Eqs. (2.2) – (2.15), (2.17) – (2.28), (2.30), (2.32) – (2.36) in the text and 
Eqs. (A.11) – (A.15) in Appendix A.3, given the dynamic processes of the foreign 
interest rate and the export price.  Here,   ,    ,    ,    ,    , and    are 
predetermined variables.  
 
When   = 1, one may replace the household‟s budget constraint (Eq.(2.3)) with 
the following balance of payments condition: 
               
         
     
                 
       
   
                    
     
 
2.2.8.  Calibration  
 
2.2.8.1.  The risk premium and the debt-to- net worth ratio  
 
Consistent with Devereux et al. (2006), we set the deterministic steady-state 
(quarterly) risk premium of the non-traded sector to 2.47% and that of the export sector 
to 3.08%.  (i) The capitalists‟ saving rate,  , (ii) the standard error of the productivity 
shock,   , and (iii) the coefficient of the monitoring cost,  , basically govern the 
deterministic steady-state risk premium: as    or   rises, or as   falls, the 
deterministic steady-state risk premium increases.  In our baseline experiment, we 
adjust     [   ] and   to set the deterministic steady-state risk premium in the 
non-traded [export] sector. 
 
           and Tchakarov (2007) report the average debt-to-net worth 
(debt-to-equity) ratios of each year for eight major EMCs over the 1995-2004 period.  
According to their estimates, the average ratio ranges from 102.6% (in 1995) to 200.7% 
(in 1998) and the total average ratio over the period is 143.4%.  Taking into account 
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the estimates, we consider debt-to-net worth ratios, 
    
    
  
       
, ranging from 80% to 
220%.  The above three parameters ( ,   , and  ) basically govern the deterministic 
steady-state debt-to-net worth ratio: as  ,   , or   falls, the debt- to-net worth ratio 
rises.  In our baseline experiment, we maintain the deterministic steady-state risk 
premiums across all the debt-to-net worth ratios and adjust the capitalists‟ saving rate 
( ) and the standard errors of the productivity shock in the non-traded and traded 
sectors (    and    ) to obtain the deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratios.  
In the baseline experiment, the values of  ,    , and     range from 0.903 to 0.936, 
from 0.201 to 0.424, and from 0.202 to 0.424, respectively.  For example, at a 
deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratio of 220%,   is 0.903,     is 0.201, 
and     is 0.202.
14
 
 
2.2.8.2.  Other parameter values 
 
Regarding other parameter values, we follow Devereux et al. (2006).  However, 
we explore alternative calibrations of some parameters in Section 2.4. in order to 
investigate whether our baseline results are sensitive to the choice of the parameter.  
 
The other baseline parameter values are shown in Table 2.1.  Most of them are 
standard and selected from the previous literature.  Some remarks are in order.  The 
price adjustment cost parameter in the non-traded sector (   ) is set at 120, which 
implies that the average price-adjustment period in this sector is four quarters.  This 
chapter assumes that, under delayed exchange rate pass-through, the average 
price-adjustment interval in the import sector is identical to that in the non-traded sector.  
Hence,     is set to 120 under delayed pass-through. 
 
                                                   
14
 In Devereux et al. (2006), the capitalists‟ saving rate ( ) is set to 0.94, while the standard error 
of the productivity shock    ) is set equal to 0.5.  The average of debt-to-net worth ratios in the 
two sectors is 62.25%.  They report that a flexible exchange rate regime is welfare-superior to a 
fixed exchange rate regime at a debt-to-net worth ratio of 62.25%. 
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Some of the baseline parameters are calibrated to match data from the U.S. and 
Asian countries.  To calibrate the foreign interest rate shock (  
 ) and the export price 
shock (   
 ), Devereux et al. (2006) use the quarterly U.S. real interest rate (the prime 
lending rate minus the inflation rate) and an aggregate of quarterly export price data for 
Asian countries.  They run a VAR for the U.S. interest rate and the aggregate export 
price and obtain the following parameter estimates: the autocorrelation (   ) and the 
standard deviation (   ) of foreign interest rate shocks are 0.46 and 0.012, respectively, 
whereas the autocorrelation (  ) and the standard deviation (  ) of export price 
shocks are 0.77 and 0.013, respectively.  The capital share of non-traded goods ( ) 
and that of export goods ( ) are set at 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, on the basis of the 
findings of Cook and Devereux (2006) for Thailand and Malaysia.  Cook and 
Devereux (2006) find that the export sector is much more capital intensive than the 
non-traded sector in the two countries.  The share of non-traded goods in the CPI (a) 
is set equal to 0.55, which implies that the deterministic steady-state share of non-traded 
goods in GDP is 54% - consistent with Thai and Malaysian data.  
 
2.2.9.  Solution method and the welfare metric 
 
A second-order approximation technique is used to solve the model numerically 
because this higher-order approximation is more suitable for welfare evaluations than a 
first-order approximation method.
15
  In this chapter, we employ the solution method of 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
16
 
 
In line with Devereux et al. (2006), we use the following welfare metric.  Since the 
population of risk neutral capitalists in each sector is one and they die at any time 
period with probability (   ), the total expected utility of the economy under flexible 
exchange rates can be written as: 
                                                   
15
 See Section 2.1. 
16
 We use the Matlab codes of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, which are available at the following 
URL: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~uribe/2nd_order.htm 
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where the subscript f indicates a flexible exchange rate regime.  We assume that the 
discount factor is the same for households and capitalists. 
 
Then, we define   ,   ,   
  , and   
   implicitly as  
            
 
   
   
   
 
   
     
  
   
   
 
   
   
            
  
   
   
   
 
   
      
  
   
   
 
   
   
             
      
  
 
   
        
  
 
   
     
             
      
  
 
   
        
  
 
   
               
 
We may call    and    the permanent consumption and labour effort of households 
and refer to   
   and   
   as the permanent consumption of capitalists in the 
non-traded and export sectors under the flexible exchange rate regime, respectively.  
Using   ,   ,   
  , and   
  , the total expected utility under the flexible exchange 
rate regime can be rewritten as: 
            
  
   
          
  
  
   
          
   
   
     
   
      
 
 
Similarly, the total expected utility of the economy under fixed exchange rates can 
be written as: 
            
  
   
          
   
  
   
          
   
   
     
   
      
 
 
where the subscript s indicates a fixed exchange rate regime.  
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Describing   as the fraction of permanent consumption required to achieve the 
same expected utility or to make households and capitalists indifferent between the two 
regimes,   is implicitly defined as 
        
         
   
          
   
  
   
          
    
        
     
   
      
    
 
In other words, the value of   represents the consumption cost of shift from the 
flexible exchange rate regime to the fixed exchange rate regime.  If a value of   is 
positive, it indicates that the flexible exchange rate regime is welfare-superior to the 
fixed exchange rate regime, and vice versa.   
 
 
2.3.  Welfare evaluations 
 
This section presents the welfare results of our baseline experiment.  Here, we 
analyze the welfare implications of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes when the 
economy faces the two exogenous shocks (foreign interest rate and export price shocks) 
simultaneously.  This section considers the following two cases: complete (full) 
exchange rate pass-through and delayed (low) pass-through. 
 
2.3.1.  Balance sheet effects on macroeconomic variables 
 
Before presenting the welfare results, we now consider the implications of balance 
sheet effects on macroeconomic variables.  Table 2.2 shows the means and standard 
deviations of key variables.  In the table,    is real price adjustment costs in the 
non-traded sector, divided by the deterministic steady-state value of non-traded output: 
     
   
 
 
         
     
 
  
     , where    denotes the deterministic steady-state 
value of non-traded output.     is real price adjustment costs in the import sector, 
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divided by   :      
   
 
 
         
     
 
  
     .      and     are risk premiums 
in the non-traded and export sectors, respectively :  
         
       
       
        
       
       
          
               
       
       
        
       
       
          
 
   is domestic-inflation (non-traded goods inflation):              .  The other 
variables correspond to those in the text and Appendix A.3.  The means of    and 
   refer to differences from their deterministic steady-state values.  The statistics of 
the other variables are defined as percentage deviations from their deterministic 
steady-state values:    
      
 
 denotes the percentage deviation of a variable    
from its deterministic steady-state value, where x is its deterministic steady-state value.  
All statistics and the consumption cost are measured in per cent, that is, they are 
multiplied by 100. 
 
Columns [1] and [2] correspond to the case with a debt-to-net worth ratio of 62% 
under full exchange rate pass-through, which is consistent with the calibration of 
Devereux et al. (2006).  Columns [3] and [4] coincide with the case with a debt-to-net 
worth ratio of 200% under full pass-through.  As can be seen from the table, as the 
debt-to-net worth ratio rises, balance sheet effects become stronger and uncertainty and 
macroeconomic instability increase.  We observe that, when the debt-to-net worth 
ratio rises from 62% to 200%, average risk premiums in the non-traded and export 
sectors (      and      ) increase and the average levels of output in the two sectors 
(     and     ) fall.  In addition, average consumption (    ) declines and average 
labour supply (   ) increases, which lowers household welfare.  Moreover, we see 
that, when the debt-to-net worth ratio rises from 62% to 200%, the standard deviations 
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of the key variables increase
17
- which implies that uncertainty intensifies as the 
debt-to-net worth ratio rises. 
 
We also notice that, with a large stock of foreign currency debt, the financial 
accelerator could have more adverse impacts on the export sector than on the 
non-traded sector.  At a debt-to-net worth ratio of 62%, non-traded output falls more 
than traded output (or the decline rate is almost the same for both sectors).  On the 
other hand, at a debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%, traded output declines far more than 
non-traded output.  At a debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%, firms reduce investment by 
more - equivalently reduce the stock of capital by more -, since the effective cost of 
foreign borrowing is higher, compared to the case with a debt-to-net worth ratio of 62%.  
Then, they further increase labour because it is relatively cheaper.
18
  By increasing 
labour inputs, the non-traded sector can mitigate large declines in output, since the 
non-traded sector is labour intensive.  On the other hand, the export sector fails to do it, 
since the export sector is capital intensive.  As a result, traded output falls much more 
than non-traded output.  This implies that, with a large stock of foreign currency debt, 
the economic slowdown could become more severe in the export sector than in the 
non-traded sector. 
 
2.3.2.  Welfare evaluations in the case of complete pass-through  
 
We now consider the welfare comparison of fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes under complete (full) exchange rate pass-through, where     is set at 0.  
Although there are many types of flexible exchange rate regimes, here we refer to strict 
CPI inflation targeting as the flexible exchange rate regime.  This policy rule 
corresponds to the interest rule when      in Eq. (2.33). 
 
                                                   
17
 The nominal exchange rate under the peg is an exception, since by definition the peg 
completely eliminates nominal exchange rate volatility. 
18
 We notice from Table 2.2 that the real wage declines when the debt-to-net worth ratio rises from 
62% to 200%.  
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The results are summarized in Fig. 2.2.  The vertical axis indicates the 
consumption cost,   (  is measured in per cent, that is, it is multiplied by 100), while 
the horizontal axis does the debt-to-net worth ratio.  The solid line describes the 
consumption cost under full pass-through.  Figure 2.2 shows that   exceeds zero for 
all debt-to-net worth ratios.  This means that the flexible exchange rate regime is 
welfare-superior to the fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
We now focus on the means and the standard deviations under columns [3] and [4], 
which correspond to the case with a debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%.  Notice that 
average consumption is lower with the peg relative to the float (      -2.83 % under 
the peg, while       -2.49 % under the float).  The welfare-superiority of the float 
over the peg is mainly accounted for by the lower consumption under the peg.
19
  The 
main reason for the lower consumption under the peg is that output loss due to price 
adjustment costs (the amount of non-traded output which is used up by these costs) is 
larger under the peg.  Since by design the peg acts so as to stabilize the nominal 
exchange rate completely and not to directly respond to domestic-inflation (  ), the 
peg generates more volatile domestic-inflation
20
 and hence higher price adjustment 
costs than the float
21
:      1.19% under the peg, whereas       0.45% under the 
float. (recall that price adjustment costs in the non-traded sector increase with 
domestic–inflation).  As discussed in subsection 2.2.7., this implies that the peg 
generates larger output loss in the non-traded sector, that is, the peg generates lower 
final-output in the non-traded sector than the float.
22
  Therefore, households under the 
peg enjoy a lower average level of consumption – which lowers welfare relative to the 
                                                   
19
 We also notice that average labor (   ) is higher under the peg relative to the float.  This gives 
us another explanation about why the float is welfare-superior to the peg.   
20
 Note that the standard deviation of domestic-inflation is 1.49 % under the peg (column [4]), 
whereas that is 0.92% under the float (column [3]).. 
21
 The float cares about the effects of non-traded goods prices on the CPI, since the CPI consists of 
both non-traded goods prices and imported goods prices. 
22
 Average price adjustment costs (    ) are of non-negligible size, compared to the average 
levels of consumption and investment.  For instance, at a debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%,      = 
1.19%,                 = -1.72%,       
            = -0.86%, and               
= -5.54% under the peg. 
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float.
23
 
 
In addition, Fig. 2.2 indicates that, as the debt-to-net worth ratio rises – that is, as 
balance sheet effects become stronger -, the welfare difference between the two regimes 
becomes wider.  This result implies that flexible exchange rates are more desirable in 
terms of welfare, the higher the level of foreign currency debt.  This is mainly because 
the relative difference between the price adjustment costs of each regime becomes 
greater as the debt-to-net worth ratio rises.  As a result, the relative difference between 
consumption in each regime increases - which widens the welfare difference between 
the two regimes.   
 
This can be seen when comparing the means of price adjustment cots (  ) and 
consumption (C) under columns [1] and [2] to those under columns [3] and [4].  
When the debt-to-net worth ratio rises from 62% to 200%, the relative difference 
between the price adjustment costs of each regime increases from 0.22% (= 0.36% - 
0.14%) to 0.74% (= 1.19% - 0.45%).  The relative difference between consumption in 
each regime also increases from 0.06% (= -0.26% - -0.32%) to 0.34% (= -2.49% - 
-2.83%). 
 
2.3.3.  Welfare evaluations in the case of low pass-through  
 
Next, we now compare the float with the peg under low exchange rate pass-through, 
where     is set at 120.  Columns [5] and [6] of Table 2.2 correspond to the case 
with a debt-to-net worth ratio of 200% under low pass-through.  Notice that, when the 
monetary authority is engaged in the peg, means, standard deviations and total expected 
utility are the same for low pass-through and full pass-through, since import prices are 
identical under the two cases.  Further notice that, under low pass-through, two types 
                                                   
23
 The standard deviations of consumption and labor effort are lower with the float relative to the 
peg.  This implies that the conclusion of this subsection could hold if the model is solved by a 
first-order approximation, since its welfare measure is based on the variances of these variables. 
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of price adjustment costs are incurred: price adjustment costs in the non-traded and 
import sectors (   and   ). 
 
The results are shown in Fig. 2.2.  The dashed line represents the consumption 
cost under low pass-through.  The figure illustrates that the degree of exchange rate 
pass-through has no effect on the welfare ranking of „flexible versus fixed‟ exchange 
rate regimes:   is greater than zero for all debt-to-net worth ratios.  Figure 2.2 also 
indicates that the degree of exchange rate pass-through affects the welfare difference 
between the two regimes.  In other words, this figure indicates that the welfare 
difference between the two regimes is larger under low exchange rate pass-through than 
under full pass-through.  The reason behind this is that, when the flexible exchange 
rate regime is implemented, overall welfare is higher under delayed pass-through than 
under full pass-through (recall that, when the peg is applied, total expected utility is 
identical in the two cases).  We now focus on the case where the monetary authority 
implements the flexible exchange rate regime and compare the means under column 
[3] to those under column [5].  We notice that total price adjustment costs are lower 
under low pass-through than under full pass-through:     +      = 0.31% (= 0.12% 
+ 0.19%) under low pass-through, while     +      = 0.45% under full 
pass-through.  This implies that output loss is smaller, that is, final-output in the 
non-traded sector is higher under low pass-through than under full-pass through.
24
  
 
In addition, we observe that average households‟ foreign debt is lower under 
delayed pass-through than under full pass-through (    = -2.32% under low 
pass-through, while     = -1.85% under full pass-through).  Put differently, under 
low pass-through, the mean net foreign asset position improves relative to that under 
full pass-through. As stressed by Kollmann (2002) and         and Tchakarov 
(2007), in models with imperfect risk sharing (as assumed in this chapter), the average 
net foreign asset position has substantial impacts on household welfare.  In their 
                                                   
24
 We notice that under columns [3] and [5] the standard deviation of domestic-inflation (  ) is 
much lower under delayed pass-through than under full pass-through. 
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models, uncertainty induces households to increase their net foreign assets, which raises 
households‟ wealth and provides protection against potentially large declines in 
consumption.  Bergin et al. (2007) and         and Tchakarov (2007) refer to this 
foreign asset holdings as „precautionary saving.‟ 
 
Both of these effects (higher final-output and a lower stock of foreign debt) work in 
conjunction, generating a higher average level of consumption (and hence higher 
welfare) under low pass-through:       -2.23% (column [5]) under low pass-through, 
while      -2.49% (column [3]) under full pass-through.  This result suggests that 
flexible exchange rates are more attractive in welfare terms, the slower exchange rate 
pass-through.  
 
When CPI inflation targeting is implemented under complete exchange rate 
pass-through, the monetary authority needs to care about exchange rate fluctuations 
since exchange rate fluctuations affect the CPI immediately.  On the other hand, in the 
case of low pass-through, as indicated by Devereux et al. (2006), the monetary 
authority could use exchange rate fluctuations in order to mitigate the effects of external 
shocks and to stabilize the real economy, since the CPI responds slowly to exchange 
rate fluctuations.  This can be confirmed when focusing on the standard deviations 
under columns [3] and [5] of Table 2.2.  The standard deviation of the nominal 
exchange rate is higher with low pass-through relative to full pass-through, whereas 
those of real variables such as consumption, labour, and output are lower under low 
pass-through.   
 
 
2.4.  Robustness experiments 
 
This section provides the results of different robustness experiments which check 
the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative calibrations.  We consider various 
parameterizations of the risk premium, preferences, and the debt-to-net worth ratio.  
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Moreover, we investigate an alternative specification of the risk premium.  Since we 
confirm in subsection 2.3.3. that overall welfare is higher under low exchange rate 
pass-through than under full pass-through when the flexible exchange rate regime is 
implemented, below we focus on the welfare implications of exchange rate regimes 
under complete exchange rate pass-through. 
 
2.4.1.  The external risk premium 
 
Initially, we consider an alternative choice of the steady-state risk premium in order 
to see whether the value of the (steady-state) risk premium affects the welfare ranking 
of „flexible versus fixed‟ exchange rate regimes.  In the baseline experiment, we set 
the deterministic steady-state (quarterly) risk premiums to the same values as Devereux 
et al. (2006).  We now consider the case where the steady-state quarterly risk 
premiums are increased to the values plus 100 basis points, that is, 3.47% for the 
non-traded sector and 4.08% for the export sector.  In general, as the risk premium 
decreases, the impact of the risk premium on external borrowing tends to become 
weaker.  Therefore, we do not investigate lower values of the risk premium. 
 
The result is shown in Fig. 2.3.  This robustness experiment reinforces the main 
message of the baseline experiment: the float is welfare-superior to the peg for all 
debt-to-net worth ratios.  Moreover, the consumption cost ( ) is increasing in the 
debt-to-net worth ratio.  The figure also indicates that the consumption cost of the 
robustness experiment is nearly identical to that of the baseline experiment, although 
the former is slightly lower than the latter when the level of indebtedness is high.  
 
2.4.2.  The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3., household consumption is an important factor in the 
welfare ranking of the two regimes.  Therefore, it is useful to investigate whether and 
how the value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (     affects household 
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consumption under each regime and the welfare ranking.  Specifically, we analyze the 
two cases:       and    . 
 
The results are summarized in Fig. 2.4.  The results support the main message of 
the baseline experiment: the float is better than the peg in welfare terms.  Comparing 
the consumption cost when       to that when    , the figure illustrates that the 
former outweighs the latter.  This is because, as   rises or households become more 
risk averse, the relative difference between consumption in each regime decreases and 
consequently the consumption cost falls.  We now consider mean consumption at a 
(steady-state) debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%,  When      , mean consumption 
(    ) under the float is -3.57% and mean consumption under the peg is -4.06%.  On 
the other hand, when    , mean consumption under the float is -1.49% and mean 
consumption under the peg is -1.68%.  We observe that, when   rises from 1.1 to 4, 
the relative difference between consumption in each regime decreases from 0.49% (= 
-3.57% - -4.06%) to 0.19% (= -1.49% - -1.68%).  
 
2.4.3.  The capitalists’ saving rate 
 
In the experiments so far, we have changed the capitalists‟ saving rate ( ) and the 
standard errors of the productivity shock in the non-traded and export sectors (    and 
   ) to obtain the deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratios.  The 
deterministic steady-state (quarterly) risk premiums in the non-traded and export 
sectors are kept constant across all the debt-to-net worth ratios in the experiments.  
Next, we adjust only the capitalists‟ saving rate to obtain the deterministic steady-state 
debt-to-net worth ratios (as   falls, the debt-to-net worth ratio rises).  In this case, the 
deterministic steady-state risk premium increases with the debt-to-net worth ratio.  
Regarding the standard error of the productivity shock (  ), we follow Devereux et al. 
(2006) to set            . 
 
The result is depicted in Fig. 2.5.  The result is basically consistent with that of the 
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baseline experiment: the float welfare-dominates the peg and the consumption cost is 
increasing in the debt-to-net worth ratio.  The main reason for the superiority of the 
float over the peg is that price adjustment costs are higher with the peg relative to the 
float, as in the baseline case.  The peg generates more volatile domestic-inflation and 
hence lower final-output than the float.  Therefore, the peg reduces consumption, 
compared to the float.
25
 
 
2.4.4.  An alternative risk premium specification 
 
Finally, we consider an alternative specification of the risk premium.  As shown in 
Fig. 2.1, the model of this chapter assumes that the (steady-state) risk premium is an 
increasing and convex function of the leverage ratio within a certain range of leverage 
ratios.  However, there are various ways to model the risk premium.  For example, in 
        and Tchakarov (2007), it is assumed that the risk premium is an increasing 
and concave function of the leverage ratio.  When compared to the         and 
Tchakarov (2007) model, the marginal effect of the leverage ratio on the risk premium 
is more serious in the model of this chapter.  We now examine whether the main 
message of the baseline experiment will hold when we employ the         and 
Tchakarov-type risk premium.  For concreteness, in line with                 (2000) 
and         and Tchakarov (2007), we use the following specification with the 
constant implicit-elasticity of the risk premium to the leverage ratio:  
                     
        
     
 
  
                 
 
where   > 0 and       .  Then, following                (2000),         
and Tchakarov (2007), and Gertler et al. (2007), the optimal financial contract condition, 
capitalist consumption, and their net worth in the non-traded sector are modified as   
                                                   
25
 For instance, at a (steady-state) debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%,       = 0.11% and      = 
-0.58% under the float.  On the other hand,      = 0.24 % and     = -0.67% under the peg. 
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                     –             
          
 , and 
                                     
          
      
  respectively.
26
 
 
In this robustness experiment, the deterministic steady-state risk premium is set at 
the same value (2.47%) as in the baseline experiment and kept constant across all the 
debt-to-net worth ratios.  To obtain the deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth 
ratios, we vary both the capitalists‟ saving rate ( ) and the implicit-elasticity of the risk 
premium to the leverage ratio (  ).  Consistent with         and Tchakarov (2007), 
we set    equal to 0.02 at a deterministic steady-state debt-to-net worth ratio of 137%.  
Given the calibration of   ,    is set such that the deterministic steady-state risk 
premium is identical to 2.47%.
27  The export sector is exactly analogous. 
 
The welfare comparison is depicted in Fig. 2.6.  Figure 2.6 indicates that the main 
message of the baseline experiment is robust to the alternative specification of the risk 
premium: the float is welfare-superior to the peg and the consumption cost increases 
with the level of indebtedness.  The main reason for this is very similar to that of the 
baseline experiment.  Price adjustment costs in the non-traded sector are higher with 
the peg relative to the float.  Therefore, the peg reduces consumption compared to the 
float. 
28
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
26
 When Eq. (2.26) is replaced with Eq. (2.37),     and one equation need to be eliminated by 
combining the foreign lenders‟ participation constraint (Eq. (2.30)) and Eqs. (2.27) – (2.28).   
27
         and Tchakarov (2007) use a method to calibrate the debt-to-net worth ratio which is 
different from our method.  To obtain the steady-state debt-to-net worth ratios, they probably vary 
two parameters: one is the implicit-elasticity of the risk premium to the leverage ratio (  ) and 
another is unknown (they do not use the capitalists‟ saving rate in their baseline experiment). 
28
 For instance, at a (steady-state) debt-to-net worth ratio of 200%,       = 0.35% and      = 
-2.09% under the float.  On the other hand,      = 1.02% and     = -2.51% under the peg. 
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2.5.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter carries out a welfare comparison of fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes by employing the model of Devereux et al. (2006), which incorporates balance 
sheet effects in combination with foreign currency debt and variable exchange rate 
pass-through.  This chapter deals with a wide range of debt-to-net worth ratios that 
allows us to investigate whether and how the degree of indebtedness affects the choice 
of exchange rate regime.   
 
Although Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that many monetary authorities in 
EMCs are reluctant to allow their currencies to float freely owing to balance sheet 
vulnerabilities, we find that, under complete exchange rate pass-through, the float 
welfare-dominates the peg for a broad range of debt-to-net worth ratios.  In addition, 
the welfare difference between the two regimes becomes wider as the debt-to-net worth 
ratio rises.  The results imply that flexible exchange rates are more desirable in terms 
of welfare, the higher the level of foreign currency debt.  The different robustness 
experiments also support the main message of this chapter. 
 
Moreover, when comparing the float with the peg under low exchange rate 
pass-through, our results show that the degree of exchange rate pass-through has no 
effect on the welfare ranking of the two regimes.  However, we find that the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through affects the welfare difference between the two regimes: the 
welfare difference between the two regimes is larger under low exchange rate 
pass-through than under full pass-through.  This suggests that flexible exchange rates 
are more attractive in welfare terms, the slower exchange rate pass-through.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Exchange Rate Volatility and Balance 
Sheet Effects 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
What type of exchange rate regime is more desirable when there are financial 
market imperfections in emerging market countries (EMCs)?  This chapter 
investigates the question using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium small open 
economy model. 
 
There have been significant advances in the field of monetary and exchange rate 
policy analysis in EMCs.  Some recent studies in this field have focused on imperfect 
financial markets, especially balance sheet effects and liability dollarization, and have 
provided useful insights into the behaviour of EMCs.  For instance, Devereux et al. 
(2006) develop a small open economy model which incorporates balance sheet effects 
coupled with foreign currency debt
1
  Their model accounts for so-called 
„contractionary devaluations‟, which are empirically observed in EMCs: an exchange 
rate depreciation has a negative effect on firms‟ balance sheets, which raises the cost of 
foreign borrowing, thereby bringing about real contractions (See Chapter 1 for balance 
sheet effects and contractionary devaluations).  They conduct a welfare-based 
                                                   
1
 For a sample of other related work, see Cavoli (2009),          et al. (2002, 2004), Choi and 
Cook (2004), Cook (2004),         and Tchakarov (2007), Gertler et al. (2007),        and 
Winkelried (2005).  The model of Cavoli (2009) and that of        and Winkelried (2005) do not 
include micro-foundations. 
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comparison of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes based on a second-order 
accurate welfare measure and their model predicts that flexible exchange rates 
welfare-dominate fixed exchange rates even in the presence of balance sheet effects and 
foreign currency debt. 
 
   However, the model of Devereux et al. (2006) generates predicted exchange rate 
volatility that is extremely low, compared to that seen in historical data.  Thus, it might 
underestimate balance sheet vulnerabilities under flexible exchange rates.  They report 
that, when exchange rate pass-though is complete, the predicted standard deviation of 
the quarterly nominal exchange rate under strict CPI inflation targeting is only 1.80 %.
2
  
This is because, as we will discuss below, their model assumes a stable relationship 
between the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate.  On the other hand, 
Kollmann (2005) finds that the estimated standard deviation of the quarterly nominal 
exchange rate between the U.S. and a basket of major EU countries (France, Germany 
and Italy) during 1973:1-1994:4 was 8.75%.  Taking into account a line of empirical 
evidence that EMCs tend to be more vulnerable to volatile capital flows than 
industrialized countries (e.g., Schaechter et al., 2000), nominal exchange rate volatility 
in EMCs could be even greater than the estimate of Kollmann (8.75%).  This implies 
that the impact of exchange rate variability on the net worth position of domestic firms 
could be more severe than that reported in Devereux et al. (2006).     
 
This chapter attempts to conduct a welfare-based comparison of fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes by using an extended version of the Devereux et al. (2006) 
model.  This extended model mainly differs from that of Devereux et al. in that it 
emphasises the role of exchange rate volatility and generates more realistic exchange 
                                                   
2
 They also present the predicted standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate under strict 
domestic-inflation targeting (non-traded goods price targeting): the predicted standard deviation is 
3.4%.  Their predicted standard deviations of the nominal exchange rate seem lower, compared to 
those reported in the literature on monetary policy in emerging market countries.  For example, the 
model of Ravenna and Natalucci (2008) generates much more volatile nominal exchange rates than 
that of Devereux et al. (2006): the standard deviation in their baseline experiment is 8.02%. 
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rate volatility.  Although there are various ways to model the nominal exchange rate
3
, 
we employ the specification developed by Kollmann (2002, 2005).  Motivated by the 
fact that empirical results find no support for the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition under flexible exchange rates, his model allows for a stationary and 
exogenous AR(1) shock to the UIP condition in order to generate sufficient exchange 
rate variability.  He regards the UIP shock as reflecting a temporary but persistent bias 
in the agent‟s exchange rate forecast.  This chapter assumes that under flexible 
exchange rates the forecast bias disturbs the stable relationship between the exchange 
rate and the interest rate (we refer to the shock as the „forecast bias shock‟, hereafter).  
On the other hand, we assume that under fixed exchange rates there is no bias in 
exchange rate forecasts (that is, the forecast bias shock applies only under flexible 
exchange rates)
4
, on the basis of the fact that deviations from UIP were considerably 
small in the Bretton Woods era (e.g., Kollmann, 2005).  We will discuss this issue in 
subsection 3.3.1. 
 
Besides the forecast bias shock, the model here features two production sectors (the 
non-traded sector and the export sector), Calvo-type sticky prices in the non-traded 
sector, imperfect international risk sharing, balance sheet effects in combination with 
foreign currency debt, and exogenous foreign interest rate and export price shocks.  
The model is calibrated using parameter values from the literature and some values that 
match Thai data (we call this calibrated model the „baseline model‟, hereafter).  Given 
the calibration, we assess the welfare implications of the fixed exchange rate regime 
(the peg) and a flexible exchange rate regime where the monetary authority strictly 
targets the inflation rate of the CPI (denoted the „CPI rule‟, henceforth). 
 
   This chapter also performs different simulations in order to check the sensitivity of 
the baseline model to alternative calibrations.  We consider alternative calibrations of 
                                                   
3
 For instance,               (2006) uses six different types of exchange rate specifications 
in order to describe realistic exchange rate behavior. 
4
 In Kollmann (2002, 2004), this assumption is employed.  See subsection 3.3.1. 
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the forecast bias shock to see whether and how the parameter value of the forecast bias 
shock affects the baseline results.  In addition, we compare the peg to alternative 
flexible exchange rate regimes whereby the central bank implements strict 
domestic-inflation targeting (non-traded goods price targeting) or Taylor rules.  
Further, we compare exchange rate regimes with and without balance sheet constraints 
in order to examine whether and how the presence of these constraints affects the 
welfare assessment of exchange rate regimes.    
 
The model is solved using a quadratic approximation method which allows us to 
obtain a second-order accurate representation of expected utility and to conduct a 
rigorous welfare evaluation of exchange rate regimes.          and Tchakarov 
(2007) argue that, since a second-order approximation method can capture the effects of 
uncertainty on the means of endogenous variables (e.g., consumption and labour), the 
method is more suitable for assessing welfare than a first-order approximation method 
(the welfare measure based on a first-order approximation depends only on variances) .  
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows.  First, the peg is 
welfare-superior to the CPI rule for realistic calibrations of the forecast bias shock.  In 
addition, as exchange rate volatility increases, the welfare difference between the two 
regimes becomes wider (the peg becomes more attractive in terms of welfare).  Under 
the CPI rule, forecast bias shocks increase exchange rate variability, which causes a 
marked deterioration in balance sheets – the shocks thus have a more harmful effect on 
the average level of capitalist consumption under the CPI rule.  Moreover, under the 
CPI rule, price dispersion across non-traded goods firms increases with exchange rate 
volatility, which in combination with marked balance sheet deterioration induces a large 
fall in non-traded output
5
, thereby lowing household consumption relative to the peg.  
These two negative effects work together, generating lower welfare under the CPI rule. 
                                                   
5
 We assume Calvo-type sticky prices in the non-traded sector.  The nature of price rigidity 
generates inefficient price dispersion across non-traded goods firms and thus output loss.  We will 
discuss this topic in subsection 3.2.8.   
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Second, strict domestic-inflation targeting outperforms the CPI rule, since strict 
domestic-inflation targeting completely eliminates inefficient price dispersion across 
non-traded goods firms.  Whether the peg is welfare-superior to strict 
domestic-inflation targeting or not depends on the degree of exchange rate volatility – 
the peg is more desirable in welfare terms when exchange rate volatility is high.   
 
Third, the presence of balance sheet effects is very important for the welfare 
assessment of exchange rate regimes.  When comparing the peg with the CPI rule, we 
find that the presence of balance sheet constraints affects the welfare difference across 
the two regimes, that is, it increases the welfare difference between the two regimes -, 
although the presence of the constraints does not alter the welfare ranking of the two 
regimes (the peg is welfare-superior to the CPI rule in the economy with and without 
balance sheet constraints).  In the comparison of the peg relative to strict 
domestic-inflation targeting, our results reveal that the presence of balance sheet 
constraints alters the welfare ranking of the two regimes when exchange rate volatility 
is high.  In the economy without balance sheet constraints, strict domestic-inflation 
targeting welfare-dominates the peg under plausible calibrations of exchange rate 
volatility, whereas in the economy with balance sheet constraints the peg 
welfare-dominates the strict domestic-inflation targeting regime when exchange rates 
are highly volatile (as mentioned above).   
 
This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2. presents the model and 
calibration.  Section 3.3. describes the results of the baseline model and Section 3.4. 
presents the results of sensitivity analysis.  Section 3.5. concludes. 
 
 
3.2.  The model    
 
Based on the previous research of Devereux et al. (2006) and Kollmann (2002, 
2004), we construct a small open economy model which includes some characteristics 
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designed for the emerging market environment: balance sheet effects coupled with 
foreign currency debt, volatile exchange rates, and vulnerabilities to external shocks 
(foreign interest rate and export price shocks).   
 
The economy consists of four sets of domestic players: households, firms 
(production firms and unfinished capital goods firms), capitalists, and the monetary 
authority.  Firms and capitalists are divided into two sectors: the non-traded goods 
sector and the export goods sector.  Two final goods (the non-traded good and the 
export good) are produced by production firms in each sector using labour and capital.  
Non-traded production firms are monopolistically competitive – non-traded goods 
prices are assumed to be sticky –, whereas traded (export) goods firms are perfectly 
competitive.  Labour is supplied by households and capitalists while capital is rented 
from capitalists.  Unfinished capital goods firms produce „unfinished‟ capital goods in 
a competitive environment by using „finished‟ capital and the investment composite 
(the same form as the household‟s consumption basket), and sell them to capitalists.  
Capitalists borrow money from foreign lenders by offering their own net worth as 
collateral, purchase „unfinished‟ capital, and convert them into „finished‟ capital.  The 
monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate in order to fix the exchange rate or 
to control inflation (and output).  
 
3.2.1.  Households  
 
There is a continuum of measure 1 of consumers.  The representative consumer‟s 
inter-temporal lifetime utility function is given by  
       
  
  
   
   
 
   
    
  
   
   
                                                                          
 
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and    is labour effort.     is a composite 
consumption index defined by the following CES function: 
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where ρ ( > 0) is the elasticity of substitution between non-traded and imported goods 
and a is the share of non-traded goods in the consumer price index.      is the 
consumption of non-traded goods while     denotes the consumption of imported 
goods.      is defined, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), by the following CES 
aggregate of the continuum of differentiated goods:  
          
 
 
   
   
    
 
                                                                                           
 
where i   [0,1] and λ ( > 1) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.     (i) 
is produced by firm i in a monopolistically competitive environment.  Demand for 
   (i) results from cost minimization subject to Eq. (3.2): 
                
      
   
                 
 
where        is the price of    (i) and      is the price index for non-traded goods 
given by 
         
 
 
         
 
                                                                                          
 
On the other hand, it is assumed that the law of one price holds for imports
6
, so that 
the price of imports in terms of domestic currency (   ) is 
          
                                                                                                                 
 
where    is the nominal exchange rate and    
  is the price of imports in foreign 
                                                   
6
 In Chapter 2, we introduce price adjustment costs in the import sector to investigate whether and 
how the degree of exchange rate pass-through affects the welfare assessment of exchange rate 
regimes.  In Chapter 3, we focus only on full exchange rate pass-through. 
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currency.  We assume that    
  is exogenously determined on world markets, that is, 
EMCs are price- takers.  For simplicity,    
 , is normalised to unity.  
 
The consumer price index (   ) is then: 
          
              
    
 
                                                                             
 
The representative consumer‟s budget constraint is given by 
                     
      
 
 
       
         
   
 
 
      
 
  
     
        
      
                                                                            
 
where    is the nominal wage rate and     > 0 , a constant.  Here    and   
  are 
nominal stocks of one-period local and foreign currency bonds, respectively.     is the 
nominal interest rate on the domestic bond maturing in period t +1, while   
 , denotes 
the nominal interest rate on the foreign bond maturing in period t +1, which is assumed 
to follow an exogenous stochastic process.  It is assumed that holding foreign 
currency bonds is subject to a small transaction cost,   
   
 
 
      
 
  
  , where the cost is 
denominated in the composite consumption index.
7
  Finally, since households own all 
domestic firms, they receive any profits from the firms.  Assuming that traded goods 
firms and unfinished capital goods firms are perfectly competitive, households receive 
profits only from the non-traded sector,     
      
 
 
. 
 
The representative consumer‟s problem is to maximize its expected utility (Eq. 
(3.1)) with respect to                     
   subject to the budget constraint (Eq. 
                                                   
7
 To ensure that the model is solved numerically using a second-order approximation, this small 
transaction cost is required.  Without this cost, local and foreign currency bonds and consumption 
would be non-stationary.   Further, we assume that holding foreign currency bonds by households 
is not subject to informational problems, while foreign borrowing by capitalists is subject to 
informational asymmetries (see subsection 2.2.5.). 
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(3.6)).  It follows that the first order conditions are: 
      
 
    
                                                                                                            
        
      
 
  
 
  
      
     
  
   
    
     
    
  
                                        
            
  
   
    
     
                                                                                     
 
Eq. (3.7) represents the labour supply condition.  Eqs. (3.8) - (3.9) correspond to the 
Euler equations for foreign and domestic currency bonds, respectively. 
 
3.2.2.  Production firms 
 
The production technology for a non-traded good firm i   [0,1] is given by: 
             
       
          
                                                            
 
The production technology for an exporter i   [0,1] is given by: 
                     
       
          
                          
 
where α and γ are the shares of capital in each sector.  Ω is the share of 
household-labour.  Production firms in the non-traded sector hire labour from 
households,    , and from capitalists in the same sector,    
 .  In return, capitalists in 
the non-traded sector earn wages,    
 .  Capital,     , is supplied by capitalists in the 
non-traded sector.  The export sector is entirely analogous (    is labour services 
supplied by households and    
  denotes those by capitalists in the export sector.  
    is capital provided by capitalists in the export sector).    
 
Firm i in the non-traded sector chooses       ,       , and    
     so as to 
minimize its total cost 
                                  
    
    , 
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subject to the production function (Eq. (3.10)) and to taking        as given.  Here, 
    denotes the rental rate of capital in the non-traded sector.  The first-order 
conditions are then 
                 
   
   
      
    
            
                                  
 
          
      
      
 
          
   
 
          
   
    
      
 
              
    
  
 
where we have made use of the fact that the Lagrange multiplier is equal to the 
marginal cost, and         denotes the marginal cost .  We notice that the marginal 
cost, the household-labour capital ratio (
   
   
), and the capitalist-labour capital ratio (
   
 
   
) 
are identical across firms.  We thus drop the index i.   
     
   
   
          
            
                                  
                                        
   
   
 
         
   
                                                                                                
 
   
 
   
  
             
    
                                                                                    
 
Similarly, the following optimality conditions in the export sector can be derived 
from cost minimization:  
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where    
  and     denote the nominal wage rate for capitalists and the rental rate of 
capital in the export sector, respectively, and     is total traded output given by 
       
    
          
                                                                             
 
    is the unit price of the export good and also the unit production cost since the 
export sector is perfectly competitive.  It is assumed that the law of one price holds for 
export goods: 
          
                                                                                                                  
 
where    
  is the foreign currency price of the export good, which is exogenously 
determined on world markets and follows a stochastic process. 
 
3.2.3.  Price setting 
 
Non-traded production firms are monopolistically competitive and thus set prices 
for their products.  The present model assumes staggered price setting   la Calvo 
(1983) and Yun (1996).  In each period, production firm i in the non-traded sector 
receives the chance to set its price optimally with probability     ), a constant, 
which is independent of history and other firms.  If the firm does not get the chance, 
he/she has to keep charging the same price as last period.  
 
Suppose that firm i receives this opportunity in period t.  Let denote        the 
price that the firm chooses.  The firm chooses        so as to maximize the 
following profit function subject to demand for firm i’s product, 
    
      
      
     
       
 : 
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where     
  denotes aggregate demand for non-traded goods and        is the 
households‟ discount factor given by 
                  
 
  
   
    
     
          
 
Since non-traded firms are owned by households, the expected profit stream needs to 
be discounted using the household‟s discount factor.  It is assumed that the firms must 
satisfy all demand at posted prices. 
 
   Notice that all firms that set their new prices select the same price.  Thus, we drop 
the index i.  Defining         
   
   
    
     
    
        
 , the optimal pricing 
condition is then  
    
 
   
                 
   
   
           
   
   
                                                                  
 
In order to use a higher order approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the 
model, we need to rewrite Eq. (3.19) in a recursive representation.  In line with 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), rearranging Eq. (3.19) yields  
            
             
   
     
       
  
   
 
 
   
     
  
      
     
 
   
   
   
 
Define   
  and   
  as 
              
      
             
   
     
       
 
   
 
 
   
     
 
   
   
     
              
      
        
   
     
       
                     
   
   
 
 
Using   
  and   
 , Eq. (3.19) can be rewritten in the following three first-order 
difference equations: 
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   Eq. (3.3) implies that the price index     evolves according to 
   
          
            
   
                                                                 
 
3.2.4.  Unfinished capital goods firms 
 
The behaviour of unfinished capital goods firms is completely identical to that of 
unfinished capital goods firms in Chapter 2.  Below, we outline the specification of 
unfinished capital goods firms‟ behaviour. 
   
As in Chapter 2, unfinished capital goods firms are perfectly competitive.  It is 
assumed that new unfinished capital goods in the non-traded sector are produced by 
combining both the investment composite,    , and the exiting capital stock,   .  
The investment composite consists of the same mixture as the household‟s 
consumption basket.  Defining     as the price of an unfinished capital good and 
    
  as the rental rate of capital provided by capitalists, the profit function of 
unfinished capital goods firms in the non-traded sector is given by 
           
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
               
     
 
where   represents the investment adjustment cost parameter (    ) and   is the 
depreciation rate.  Then, profit maximization implies that 
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The problem is analogous for unfinished capital goods firms in the export sector.  
Defining     as the price of an unfinished capital good and     
  as the rental rate of 
capital, the first-order conditions in the export sector are then 
     
  
     
   
   
   
                                                                                          
    
         
   
   
   
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                               
 
Capital stocks in the two sectors evolve according to 
       
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                                      
       
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
                                                        
 
3.2.5.  Capitalists 
 
The behaviour of capitalists is the same as in Chapter 2.  Therefore, here we 
provide a brief outline of the capitalist sector.
8
  For notational simplicity, below we 
drop capitalist-specific indices.  
 
Profit maximizing behaviour in the non-traded sector implies the following optimal 
financial contract condition:
9
 
                                                   
8
 See Chapter 2 (subsection 2.2.5.) for more details.   
9
 See Appendix A.1. for the derivation of the optimal financial contract condition.  The 
derivation and definition of     ,     ,  ,      , and       are shown in Appendix A.2. 
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where          and          are the expected shares of the return on capital 
going to capitalists and to foreign lenders, respectively, and        is the real gross 
return on capital.  The foreign lenders‟ participation constraint in the non-traded sector 
is given by  
                          
     
             
    
                              
 
Assuming that capitalists die at any time period with probability (   ) and 
consume the returns on capital only when they die, the aggregate consumption of 
capitalists in the non-traded sector is given by 
        
                                      
                                        
     
              
 
where    
   
            
    
  is the amount borrowed abroad at the end of period t-1 
and     is the expected fraction of the return on capital that is used up in monitoring  
(monitoring costs are assumed to be denominated in the composite final good).  We 
assume that   
  comprises the same mix as the household‟s consumption basket. 
 
Aggregate net worth consists of the unconsumed fraction of the returns and wages 
earned by capitalists working in the non-traded production sector, that is, 
                                       
          
                                
     
            
               
 
Eqs. (3.32)-(3.33) imply that an exchange rate depreciation, e.g. triggered by a sudden 
increase in the foreign interest rate and an unanticipated worsening of terms of trade, 
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would reduce capitalist consumption and their net-worth.  
 
Recalling that capitalists rent their finished capital to production firms and to 
unfinished capital goods firms and capital depreciates at the rate of  , the real gross 
return on capital in the non-traded sector,       , is defined as the sum of      , 
      
 , and           , divided by the purchase price of capital, that is,  
       
            
            
   
                                                      
 
The behaviour of capitalists in the export sector is described analogously.  Let the 
subscript X denote the export sector.  Eqs. (3.35) - (3.36) describe the optimal financial 
contract condition and the foreign lenders‟ participation constraint in the export sector, 
respectively:  
                  
         
         
           
   
         
         
    
  
 
      
                             
 
                          
     
             
    
                                
 
The consumption of capitalists,   
  , and their net worth,      , are given by 
            
                                  
                                             
     
            
and 
                                      
              
                                  
     
      
                      
 
where    
   
            
    
 . 
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Finally, the real gross return on capital,       , is expressed as 
       
            
            
   
                                                       
 
3.2.6.  UIP (uncovered interest parity) and biased exchange rate 
forecasts 
 
Combining Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) yields: 
         
  
   
    
     
        
      
 
  
 
  
     
     
  
   
    
     
    
  
            
 
Taking a log linear approximation of Eq. (3.40), we obtain the modified UIP condition: 
        
         
    
  
      
      
 
  
                                                                
where    
      
 
  
 indicates bond-holding costs.  If      , the limit of Eq. (3.41) is 
given by the standard UIP condition, which equates nominal interest-rate differentials 
between countries to expected variations in nominal exchange rates: 
                  
         
    
  
                  
Since we assume that      , the standard UIP condition does not hold.  But, 
deviations from UIP, arising from bond-holding costs, are insignificant, because     
is calibrated to be very small.  Therefore, in this log-linearized form, the path of the 
nominal exchange rate basically depends on the standard UIP condition (although not 
perfectly), and all domestic players make exchange rate forecasts based on the stable 
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate.  Recent 
papers including          et al. (2002, 2004), Choi and Cook (2004), Cook (2004), 
Devereux et al. (2006), and         and Tchakarov (2007) which incorporate 
balance sheet constraints coupled with foreign currency debt assume this stable 
relationship (log-linearizing their models, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate 
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basically depend on the standard UIP condition).
10
 
 
   However, as stressed by Kollmann (2005),               (2006) and others, 
much of empirical work has failed to find reliable relationships between the exchange 
rate and the interest rate, especially the standard UIP condition.  Motivated by the 
failure, this chapter assumes the stable relationship between the nominal exchange rate 
and the nominal interest rate is disturbed by an exogenous random shock.  Specifically, 
following Kollmann (2002, 2004, 2005), it is assumed that a stationary exogenous 
stochastic random variable,   , perturbs the households‟ Euler equation for foreign 
currency bonds (Eq. (3.8)): 
          
      
 
  
 
  
      
     
  
   
    
     
    
  
                                 
 
where the unconditional mean of    is unity (     ).  Combining Eqs. (3.9) and 
(3.42) and taking a log linear approximation give 
        
         
    
  
      
      
 
  
                                                      
Eq. (3.43) implies that    could induce large deviations from standard UIP, depending 
on calibrations of   .  In line with Kollmann, we regard    as a bias in the date t 
forecast of the date t +1 exchange rate,     
11
(we refer to    as the „forecast bias 
shock‟12).  We also assume that capitalists have the same forecast bias as households 
and that    disturbs the optimal contract condition in the non-traded sector (Eq. 
                                                   
10
 Gertler et al. (2007) consider a random shock to the standard UIP condition.  However, their 
analysis is based on a first-order approximation method, not using a second-order accurate welfare 
measure.  
11
 Kollmann (2002, pp.1010) defines the biased exchange forecast as follows: „Household beliefs 
at period t about the date t + 1 exchange rate (    ) are given by a probability density function (pdf), 
  
 , that differs from the true pdf,   , by a factor     :   
          
   
    
  
  
  
, where   is any 
other random variable‟.  We employ this definition in the present model. 
12
 Kollmann (2002, 2004, 2005) calls the random variable the„ UIP shock‟.  Batini et al. (2003), 
Cavoli (2009), Leitemo and and            (2005), McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000), 
       and Winkelried (2005),               (2006), etc. also use this type of shock.  They 
refer to it as the „(foreign exchange) risk premium (shock)‟. 
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(3.30)): 
                          
         
         
            
        
     
         
         
    
  
                                                                         
 
The capitalists‟ forecast of the rate of exchange rate depreciation is subject to the same 
„bias shock‟ as the households‟ forecast, that is, like households, the capitalists‟ forecast 
is      
    
  
 . 
 
Similarly, the optimal financial contract condition in the export sector (Eq. (3.35)) is 
replaced with the following equation: 
                          
         
         
            
        
     
         
         
    
  
                                                                          
 
3.2.7.  Monetary policy rules 
 
The monetary authority manages a short-term nominal interest rate,   .  A change 
in the interest rate has a direct effect on households‟ behaviour via Eq. (3.9).  The 
interest rule takes the following simple form:  
      
    
  
 
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
                                                                
 
where               and           .     and   denote deterministic 
steady-state levels of domestic-inflation (non-traded goods inflation) and CPI inflation, 
respectively (throughout this paper, the term „steady state‟ indicates the deterministic 
steady state).     is a nominal exchange rate target and   is a steady-state level of the 
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short-term nominal interest rate.  Here,    ,  , and    are set to unity.
 
 
The monetary authority adjusts the short-term interest rate in response to 
domestic-inflation (   ), CPI inflation (  ) and the nominal exchange rate.         
indicates that the central bank strictly targets the domestic-inflation rate (strict 
domestic-inflation targeting).       corresponds to strict CPI inflation targeting 
(the CPI rule).       means that the monetary authority implements a fixed 
exchange rate regime (a peg).  Following Bergin et al. (2007), Devereux et al. (2006), 
        and Tchakarov (2007), and Kollmann (2002, 2004), we assume that all 
monetary policy rules are completely credible.   
 
3.2.8.  Equilibrium 
 
Recalling that foreign-bond-holding costs by households and monitoring costs by 
foreign lenders are denominated in the composite final good, the aggregate demand for 
non-traded goods is  
         
    
   
  
 
  
              
     
    
   
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
         
 
               
  
 
               
  
                                               
 
The market clearing condition for non-traded goods is then 
       
      
          
                 
                                                 
 
where      
      
   
   
 
 
  .13  Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) refer to    as the 
resource costs, which represent an index of inefficient price dispersion across 
non-traded goods firms or output loss in the non-traded sector (if     ,       
 ).  
Therefore, actual output (final output) in the non-traded sector is   
  (we refer to   
  
                                                   
13
 See Appendix B.1. for the derivation of Eq. (3.48). 
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as „actual output,‟ henceforth).  In line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a),    can 
be rewritten as the following recursive form: 
         
   
   
 
  
   
     
   
 
  
                                                              
 
The labour market must also clear.  Assuming that labour supply by capitalists is 
completely inelastic, or fixed at one for each sector,  
                                                                                                                    
            
    
            
    
 
In addition, the market clearing condition for local currency bonds,   , must be 
satisfied, which means      (it is assumed that foreigners do not hold local 
currency bonds   ). 
 
Finally, the exogenous variables,   
 ,    
 , and    are assumed to follow AR(1) 
processes:  
  
         
         
                                                                                     
       
              
                                                                                       
        
                                                                                                  
 
where    ,    , and     are i.i.d. disturbances with standard deviations   ,   , and 
  , respectively. 
 
Equilibrium is a set of 39 sequences (   ,    ,     ,    ,    ,   ,   
  ,   
  , 
  ,     
 ,    
 ,   ,     ,    ,   ,    
 ,    ,     ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    , 
   ,     
 ,     
 ,     ,     ,    ,    ,   ,    ,   
 ,   
 ,    ,    ,    ,    , 
  
 ), which satisfies Eqs. (3.4) – (3.7), (3.9), (3.11) – (3.18), (3.20) – (3.29), (3.31) - 
(3.34), (3.36) - (3.39), (3.42), and (3.44) – (3.50), given Eqs. (3.51) - (3.53).  Here, 
   ,    ,    ,    , and   
  are predetermined variables. 
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Imports (   ) are given by 
                   
   
  
 
  
              
     
    
   
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
 
                      
               
  
 
               
  
         
 
3.2.9.  Calibration  
 
This subsection describes the parameters used in the baseline model, which are 
shown in Table 3.1.  Most of the parameters are selected from the previous literature.  
Some parameters are calibrated to match Thai data.  
 
3.2.9.1.  Preferences   
    
The quarterly discount factor    is set at 0.98, approximately in the middle 
between that of Devereux et al. (2006) and that of Uribe and Yue (2006).  In line with 
much of the open economy macro-literature, the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity 
of substitution ( ) is set equal to 2.  Regarding the inverse of the elasticity of labour 
supply ( ), the coefficient on labour in utility ( ), and the elasticity of substitution 
between non-traded and imported goods in consumption (ρ), we set        , 
following Devereux et al. (2006) and         and Tchakarov (2007).  In 
accordance with Devereux et al. (2006), the share of non-traded goods in the CPI (a) is 
set equal to 0.55, which implies that the steady-state share of non-traded goods in GDP 
is 52% - broadly consistent with Thai and Malaysian data.
14 
 
 
 
                                                   
14
 Devereux et al. (2006) report that the average share of non-traded goods in total GDP in 
Thailand was 54% over the period 1980-1998 and the average share in Malaysia was similar to that 
of Thailand. 
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3.2.9.2.  Technology and capital accumulation 
    
The capital share of non-traded goods ( ) and that of export goods ( ) are set at 0.3 
and 0.7, respectively, following Devereux et al. (2006) who choose these two 
parameters on the basis of the findings of Cook and Devereux (2006) for Thailand and 
Malaysia.  As in Devereux et al. (2006), the household-labour share,  , is set to 0.95.  
We set the quarterly capital depreciation rate,  , to 0.025, which is within the range of 
the literature.  In line with Devereux et al. (2006) and         and Tchakarov 
(2007), the investment adjustment cost parameter,   , is chosen to be 12.  Regarding 
the bond adjustment cost parameter, we follow         and Tchakarov (2007) to set 
          .       
  
   The elasticity of substitution between differentiated non-traded goods,  , is set at 
11 so that the steady-state mark-up is 10%, which is used in much of the literature.  
We set the price stickiness parameter,  , equal to 0.75, implying that the frequency of 
price adjustment is 4 quarters, the standard estimate used in the literature. 
 
   The parameters related to the capitalist sector are from Devereux et al. (2006).  
The monitoring cost parameter ( ) and the capitalists‟ saving rate ( ) are set at 0.2 and 
0.94, respectively.  The standard error of the idiosyncratic technology shock is chosen 
to be 0.5.  Given the calibration, the steady-state leverage ratio (the average of the two 
sectors), 
  
 
, is 1.59, which is approximately consistent with Devereux et al. (2006).  
The steady-state quarterly risk premium of the non-traded sector is 2.13%, whereas that 
of the export sector is 2.75%. 
 
3.2.9.3.  Calibration of the shocks 
    
With respect to the foreign interest rate shock and the export price shock, we closely 
follow         and Tchakarov (2007).  The foreign interest rate shock is calibrated 
according to the quarterly U.S. 3-month CD rate covering the period from 1973:1 to 
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2010:2 (the raw series was obtained from the International Monetary Fund‟s IFS 
Database: series code 60LC.ZF CDS).  The raw series is detrended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (we set        for the smoothing parameter).  We then fit 
Eq. (3.51) to the detrended data.  The result is as follows: 
 
    
                       
                                           
              
       (0.13)     (16.24) 
 
The figures in parentheses refer to the t ratio.     is exactly identical to the estimate of 
        and Tchakarov (2007), but   is slightly smaller than their estimate: 
         in         and Tchakarov.  One of the reasons might be that they use 
the different sample period (1973 – 2004). 
 
   Quarterly Malaysian data for export prices (in terms of the U.S. dollar) are not 
available.  Therefore, we use only quarterly Thai data for export prices (1990:4 – 
2010:2) in order to calibrate the export price shock (the raw series was obtained from 
the IFS Database: series code 74...ZF).  The raw series is seasonally adjusted using the 
U.S. Census Bureau and Department of Commerce‟s X-12 ARIMA method and then 
logged.  The seasonally adjusted and logged data is detrended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (       for the smoothing parameter).  We fit Eq. (3.52) to 
the transformed data.  The result is as follows (an intercept is included in the 
regression, but we do not report it in the result): 
 
          
                
                                              
        
          (15.03) 
 
The figure in parenthesis indicates the t ratio. 
 
   As we will discuss below, there is far less consensus on parameter estimates of the 
forecast bias shock, in particular which match data from EMCs.  Thus, the parameters 
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are inferred from industrialized country data from Kollmann (2005).  Using quarterly 
data for the U.S. and a basket of France, Germany, and Italy (denoted EU3, henceforth) 
covering the period from 1973:1 to 1994:4 (the post Bretton Woods era), Kollmann 
estimates the parameters of Eq. (3.53).
15
  He reports that        and          
(3.3%).  We use the parameter estimates as reference values in the baseline model.  
In the sensitivity analysis section, we deal with alternative calibrations of    to 
investigate how the persistence of the forecast bias shock affects welfare. 
 
3.2.10.  Solution method and the welfare metric 
 
A second-order approximation technique is used to solve the model numerically 
because the higher-order approximation is more suitable for welfare evaluations than a 
first-order approximation method.
16
  Here, we employ the solution method of 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
17
 
 
We use the same welfare-metric as in Chapter 2.  As shown in Chapter 2, the total 
expected utility of the economy under fixed exchange rates can be written as: 
         
  
   
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
   
      
       
      
   
 
   
                    
 
where the subscript s indicates a fixed exchange rate regime.  We assume that the 
discount factor is the same for households and capitalists. 
 
                                                   
15 Let      
             
      
    
  
 .  Kollmann (2005) regresses      
   on (i) lags 1 - 4 of 
     
   and (ii) the nominal interest rates and the detrended GDP of US and EU 3 at t, ...., t – 4.  
Then, he estimates Eq. (3.53) using the fitted      
   series (note that                 
   since 
    is very small).  
16
 Also see Section 3.1. 
17
 We use the Matlab codes of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, which are available at the following: 
URL:http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~uribe/2nd_order.htm 
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Then, using (i) the permanent consumption and labour effort of households (   and 
  ) and (ii) the permanent consumption of capitalists in the non-traded and export 
sectors (  
   and   
  ) under the fixed exchange rate regime
18
, Eq. (3.54) can be 
rewritten as: 
          
  
   
          
  
  
   
          
   
   
     
   
      
 
 
Similarly, the total expected utility under flexible exchange rates can be written as: 
           
  
   
          
   
  
   
          
   
   
     
   
      
 
 
where the subscript f indicates a flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
Characterizing   as the fraction of permanent consumption required to achieve the 
same expected utility or to make households and capitalists indifferent between the peg 
and the float,   is implicitly defined as 
       
         
   
          
   
  
   
          
    
        
     
   
      
    
 
In other words, the value of   represents the consumption cost of shift from the fixed 
exchange rate regime to the flexible exchange rate regime.  If a value of   is positive, 
it indicates that the fixed exchange rate regime is welfare-superior to the flexible 
exchange rate regime, and vice versa.  
 
 
3.3.  Welfare evaluations 
 
This section provides the welfare results of our baseline model.  First, we consider 
the case where the economy is subject to the two simultaneous shocks (foreign interest 
                                                   
18
 See Chapter 2 (subsection 2.2.9.) for more details. 
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rate and export price shocks).  Second, we deal with the case where the economy 
faces the three simultaneous shocks (these two shocks and the forecast bias shock), and 
see how the forecast bias shock affects welfare under floating exchange rates. 
 
Since CPI inflation targeting is practically used in all inflation-targeting countries, 
this chapter mainly focuses on the CPI rule (strict CPI inflation targeting), which 
corresponds to the interest rule when      in Eq. (3.46).  As indicated by 
Svensson (2000), all inflation-targeting countries target the inflation rate of the CPI or 
the index related to the CPI (e.g., the core consumer price index).  None of them 
implements domestic-inflation targeting.  We briefly consider domestic-inflation 
targeting in the sensitivity analysis section.  
 
3.3.1.  Exchange rate forecasts under the peg 
 
For simplicity, the peg is assumed to completely eliminate biases in exchange rate 
forecasts.  In other words, biased exchange rate forecasts apply under flexible 
exchange rates, not under fixed exchange rates.  Kollmann (2005) estimates the 
parameters of Eq. (3.53) using quarterly data for the U.S. and EU3 and compares the 
parameter estimates in the Bretton Woods (BW) era (1959:1 – 1970:4) with those in the 
post-BW era (1973:1 - 1994:4).  He reports that the autocorrelation (  ) and the 
standard deviation (  ) of the forecast bias shock are 0.24 and 0.0058, respectively, in 
the BW era and that the autocorrelation (  ) is 0.5 and the standard deviation (  ) is 
0.033 in the post-BW era (also see subsection 3.2.9.3.).  The evidence suggests that 
forecast bias shocks would be more persistent and far more volatile under flexible 
exchange rates than under fixed exchange rates or that deviations from UIP are much 
smaller under fixed exchange rates (biased and irrational exchange rate forecasts are 
less likely to be made under fixed exchange rates).  Taking into account the empirical 
evidence, this chapter simply assumes that there is no bias in exchange rate forecasts 
under the peg, namely the standard deviation of the forecast bias shock,   , is set at 
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zero.
19
 
 
Based on the above findings, the models of Kollmann (2002, 2004) assume that a 
peg completely eliminates biases in exchange rate forecasts.  Kollmann (2002, 
pp.1006; 2004, pp.298-299) argues that „under a (credible) peg [a monetary union] 
there is much less [no] scope for irrational exchange rate forecasts (than under a float)‟.   
 
3.3.2.  Impulse responses to a forecast bias shock under the CPI rule 
 
Before moving on to the welfare results, we now briefly consider how forecast bias 
shocks are propagated in the economy.
20
  Figure 3.1 displays the dynamic responses 
of some macroeconomic aggregates to a 1% positive forecast bias shock in period 1 
under the CPI rule (recall that the peg is assumed to completely eliminate biases in 
exchange rate forecasts.  Figure 3.1 thus depicts the dynamic responses only under the 
CPI rule).  In the figure, the horizontal axis shows time.  Total real net worth 
indicates an aggregate of real net worth in each sector.  Total investment and capitalist 
consumption also represent the sum of investment in each sector and the sum of 
capitalist consumption in each sector, respectively.  The responses of the 
macroeconomic aggregates are computed using the baseline parameter values and 
shown as percentage deviations from their deterministic steady-state values (see 
subsection 3.3.3.1. for the definition of the „percentage deviation from steady-state‟).  
They are all expressed in per cent (i.e. they are multiplied by 100). 
 
   The forecast bias shock induces an immediate depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate.  As shown in Eqs. (3.32), (3.33), (3.37), and (3.38), the exchange rate 
                                                   
19
 We may relax the above assumption as follows: the persistence and the volatility of the forecast 
bias shock (  and   ) are much lower under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange 
rates, e.g.         and           under fixed exchange rates, whereas        and 
         under flexible exchange rates (in Kollmann (2005), this modified assumption is used).  
The main message of this chapter would hold when we use this modified assumption. 
20
 We also examined how the economy responds to foreign interest rate shocks and to export price 
shocks.  Dynamic responses to these two shocks are nearly identical to those in Devereux et al. 
(2006, Fig. 3 and Fig. 6).  Therefore, we do not report the cases. 
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depreciation then reduces capitalist consumption and their real net worth, which causes 
a fall in total investment – which implies that the effective cost of foreign borrowing 
rises owing to balance sheet deterioration.  The forecast bias shock also lowers 
household consumption and consequently total absorption, which leads to a fall in 
actual output in the non-traded sector (demand for non-traded goods).  On the other 
hand, traded output rises owing to the exchange rate depreciation.  Employment falls 
in response to the forecast bias shock. 
 
3.3.3.  Welfare evaluations of the peg and the CPI rule 
 
3.3.3.1.  Results for simulations with the two simultaneous shocks (shocks to 
  ,   
 ) 
    
First, we consider the case where the economy is subject to both the foreign interest 
rate shock (  ) and the export price shock (  
 ) simultaneously, that is, the case where 
the economy is not exposed to the forecast bias shock (there is no bias in exchange rate 
forecasts both under the peg and under the CPI rule).  As discussed in subsection 
3.2.6., in this case, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate basically depend on the 
standard UIP condition (when log-linearizing the model). 
 
The results are reported in columns [1] and [2] of Table 3.2.  Column [1] considers 
the peg, while column [2] pertains to the CPI rule.  In the table, the consumption cost 
represents the welfare metric (see subsection 3.2.10.).       indicates real net worth 
in the non-traded sector, whereas      represents that in the export sector.  NFA is 
the net foreign asset position, divided by the deterministic steady-state value of nominal 
GDP (         
   , where Y is the deterministic steady-state value of nominal 
GDP).      and     are risk premiums in the non-traded and export sectors, 
respectively : 
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The other variables correspond to those in the text.  The mean of NFA is defined as the 
difference from its deterministic steady-state value.  The means and standard 
deviations of the other variables refer to percentage deviations from their deterministic 
steady-state values (   
      
 
 denotes the percentage deviation of a variable    
from its deterministic steady-state value, where x is its deterministic steady-state value).  
All statistics and the consumption cost are measured in per cent, that is, they are 
multiplied by 100. 
 
Columns [1] and [2] show that the CPI rule welfare-dominates the peg: the 
consumption cost is -0.16 %.  This mainly reflects the fact that average household 
consumption is lower and average labour supply is higher under the peg relative to the 
CPI rule (    = -0.21% and     = 0.10% under the peg, whereas     = -0.10% and 
    = 0.03% under the CPI rule).  The lower consumption under the peg appears to 
be due to the fact that average actual output in the non-traded sector is lower under the 
peg than under the CPI rule (   
  = -0.30% under the peg, while    
  = -0.15% under 
the CPI rule).  The main reason for the lower output is that resource costs are higher 
under the peg relative to the CPI rule (    =0.23% under the peg, whereas     =0.09% 
under the CPI rule).
21
  As discussed in subsection 3.2.8., resource costs represent 
inefficient price dispersion across non-traded goods firms, that is, output loss in the 
non-traded sector (see Eq. (3.48)).  Since by design the peg acts so as to stabilize the 
nominal exchange rate completely and not to directly respond to non-traded goods 
prices, the peg generates higher resource costs or the peg generates larger output loss 
than the CPI rule.  The result is broadly consistent with that of the Devereux et al. 
(2006) model which does not incorporate the forecast bias shock.
22
 
 
                                                   
21
 Note that      is the same for both regimes. 
22
 See Chapter 2 (subsection 2.3.2.) for more details. 
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Since the model assumes the stable relationship between the nominal exchange rate 
and the nominal interest rate, the predicted standard deviation of the nominal exchange 
rate (S) under the CPI rule is extremely low.  The standard deviation is 1.94% (column 
[2]), which is much smaller than that seen in historical data (e.g., Kollmann (2005) 
reports that the estimated standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate between the 
U.S. and EU3 in the post-BW era was 8.75%).  This implies that the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on balance sheets could be underestimated in this economy.  
Below, we examine how the results would change when we introduce the forecast bias 
shock under the float.  
 
3.3.3.2.  Results for simulations with the three simultaneous shocks (shocks 
to   ,   
 ,  ) 
    
Next, we deal with the case where the economy is subject to (i) the foreign interest 
rate shock,   , (ii) the export price shock,   
 , and (iii) the forecast bias shock,  , 
simultaneously (the forecast bias shock applies under the CPI rule, not under the peg).  
As explained in subsection 3.2.6., forecast bias shocks induce departures from standard 
UIP (in the log-linearized model). 
 
Columns [1] and [3] of Table 3.2 report the results of our baseline model.  Column 
[3] pertains to the CPI rule with the three simultaneous shocks (the autocorrelation of 
the forecast bias shock,   , is 0.5).  We now focus on the standard deviations of the 
variables.  Columns [1] and [3] show that all the standard deviations are higher under 
the CPI rule than under the peg.  Of special interest here is the standard deviation of 
the nominal exchange rate, S, under the CPI rule.  The standard deviation of S under 
the CPI rule is 4.4 % (column [3]), which is much higher than that in the economy 
subjected to the two simultaneous shocks (the foreign interest and export price shocks).  
As mentioned above, with the two simultaneous shocks, the standard deviation of S 
under the CPI rule is 1.94 % (column [2]), which is roughly two-fifth of that in the 
baseline model.  This implies that forecast bias shocks are the chief source of 
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exchange rate variability.
23
  As we will see in the sensitivity analysis section, exchange 
rates become more volatile as the persistence of the forecast bias shock increases. 
 
   The baseline model predicts that the peg delivers higher welfare than the CPI rule: 
the consumption cost is 0.78%.  This reflects the fact that the average levels of 
household consumption and capitalist consumption are lower with the CPI rule relative 
to the peg (    = -0.49%,    
   = -0.86%, and    
    = -2.40% under the CPI rule, 
whereas     = -0.21%,    
   = -0.21%, and    
    = -0.33% under the peg).  The 
lower consumption under the CPI rule is mainly accounted for by the following two 
factors.  First, since forecast bias shocks generate relatively high exchange rate 
volatility, balance sheet deterioration is much more serious under the CPI rule than 
under the peg – the forecast bias shocks thus have a more adverse effect on the average 
level of capitalist consumption under the CPI rule.  This can be seen when comparing 
the average levels of real net worth in the non-traded and export sectors (        
and        ) under the peg (column [1]) to those under the CPI rule (column [3]).  
They are much lower under the CPI rule than under the peg. 
 
Second, the average level of actual output in the non-traded sector is far lower with 
the CPI rule than under the peg (   
  = -0.95% under the CPI rule, while    
  = 
-0.30% under the peg) – average household consumption is thus lower under the CPI 
rule relative to the peg.  There are two main reasons for the lower output under the 
CPI rule.  One of the reasons is that resource costs are higher - output loss in the 
non-traded sector is larger - under the CPI rule, compared to the peg (    =0.48% under 
the CPI rule, whereas     =0.23% under the peg).  Under the CPI rule, price 
dispersion across non-traded goods firms increases with exchange rate volatility, 
thereby raising resource costs relative to the peg.  Another reason is that, under the 
                                                   
23
 Under our baseline parameterization, the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate (S) 
under strict domestic-inflation targeting is 7.0% (not shown in Table 3.2.).  As discussed above 
(Note 2), in Devereux et al. (2006), the predicted standard deviations of S under the CPI rule and 
under strict domestic-inflation targeting are 1.8% and 3.4%, respectively.  Compared to their model, 
the present baseline model generates somewhat realistic exchange rate volatility. 
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CPI rule,    falls much more than under the peg
24
, since foreign borrowing costs are 
higher under the CPI rule (the higher borrowing costs are due to the fact that balance 
sheet deterioration is much more severe under the CPI rule).  We observe that, under 
columns [1] and [3],      is lower under the CPI rule relative to the peg and that the 
average risk premium of the non-traded sector is higher with the CPI rule (     = 
-0.46% and      = 0.16% under the CPI rule, while      = -0.07% and      = 
0.04% under the peg).
25
  The above result is precisely the inverse of that found in the 
previous subsection and indicates that forecast bias shocks have substantial 
consequences for welfare. 
 
    We also notice that households under the CPI rule hold a larger stock of net 
foreign assets (NFA): the average net foreign asset position is 22.31% under the CPI 
rule, whereas that is 1.25% under the peg.  As indicated by Kollmann (2002) and 
        and Tchakarov (2007), in models with imperfect risk sharing (as assumed 
here), the average net foreign asset position has significant impacts on household 
welfare.  In their models, uncertainty induces households to increase their net foreign 
assets, which raises households‟ wealth and provides protection against expected 
declines in consumption.  Bergin et al. (2007) and         and Tchakarov (2007) 
refer to this foreign asset holdings as „precautionary saving.‟  Nevertheless, this 
baseline model predicts that households under the CPI rule reduce the average level of 
consumption relative to the peg.  As discussed above, the CPI rule generates (i) more 
serious balance sheet deterioration and (ii) larger output loss, thereby lowering 
consumption relative to the peg.  This implies that, under the CPI rule, these two 
negative effects overwhelm the benefits of precautionary saving.   
 
 
                                                   
24
    is defined as non-traded output which does not exclude output loss, that is, 
               
     
         
             
25
 Eq. (3.48) implies that: 
    the decline in actual output in the non-traded sector  =  the decline in    +  output loss 
e.g., under the CPI rule (column [3]),       -0.95%   =  -0.46%           -0.48% 
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3.4.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
This section performs four kinds of simulations in order to check the sensitivity of 
the baseline model to alternative calibrations.  First, this section considers alternative 
calibrations of the persistence parameter of the forecast bias shock.  Second, we 
compare the peg with strict domestic-inflation targeting in terms of welfare.  Third, we 
deal with two other flexible exchange rate regimes.  More specifically, we compare 
the peg to two types of Taylor rules.  Fourth, we consider an alternative choice of the 
price stickiness parameter.  In addition, we compare exchange rate regimes with and 
without balance sheet constraints in order to investigate whether and how the presence 
of these constraints affects the choice of exchange rate regime.  We briefly explore 
each of these experiments in turn. 
 
3.4.1.  The persistence of the forecast bias shock 
 
Initially, we investigate alternative choices of the persistence parameter of the 
forecast bias shock,   .  The objective of this subsection is to see whether the results 
of the baseline model are sensitive to the choice of the forecast-bias-shock parameter.  
As discussed in the previous section, forecast bias shocks have significant effects on the 
welfare ranking of the peg versus the CPI rule.  It is thus important to investigate 
whether and how the parameter value of    affects the results of the baseline model.  
 
As for the parameter estimate of    in Eq. (3.53), empirical results are mixed.  
According to the literature survey conducted by               (2006), the 
estimated values of    range widely from 0.261 to 0.8 (the estimates are mainly based 
on data for UK or other industrialized countries).
26
  Given the survey, there seems no 
standard value, in particular, which matches data from EMCs.  In this experiment, we 
                                                   
26
               (2006) deals with parameter estimates based on both annual data and 
quarterly data.  Here, we focus on the parameter estimates based on quarterly data, since our interest 
is to calibrate the shocks using quarterly data. 
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fix the volatility of the forecast bias shock,   , at 0.033 (3.3%, the baseline value) and 
allow    to vary within a range from 0.2 to 0.8 on the basis of the survey by 
              (2006). 
 
   The results are depicted in Fig. 3.2.  The vertical axis refers to the consumption 
cost, ϵ , which is expressed in per cent (that is, it is multiplied by 100).  The horizontal 
axis represents the persistence of the forecast bias shock,   .  The figure shows that 
the consumption cost exceeds zero within the range from 0.2 to 0.8.  This suggests 
that the peg is welfare-superior to the CPI rule under plausible calibrations of the 
persistence parameter. 
 
In addition, the figure indicates that, as    rises, the welfare difference between the 
two regimes becomes larger – the peg becomes more desirable.  The main reason for 
this is as follows: with a growing persistence (  ), exchange rate volatility increases 
and the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on balance sheets becomes greater under 
the CPI rule.  Moreover, output loss in the non-traded sector increases (resource costs 
rise) and actual output in the non-traded sector falls steeply under the CPI rule.  As a 
result, under the CPI rule consumption declines, and the relative difference between 
consumption in each regime increases – which widens the welfare difference between 
the two regimes (recall that the persistence does not affect consumption under the peg, 
since the peg is assumed to completely eliminate biases in exchange rate forecasts). 
 
This can be confirmed when comparing means and standard deviations under 
column [3] with those under column [4] of Table 3.2.  Column [3] pertains to the CPI 
rule when        (the baseline model), whereas column [4] considers the CPI rule 
when       .  Notice that, when    rises from 0.5 to 0.8, the standard deviation 
of the nominal exchange rate increases from 4.4% to 9.76% - which indicates that, as 
   rises, nominal exchange rate volatility increases.  Interestingly, this predicted 
standard deviation (9.76%) is roughly similar to the estimate for U.S. and EU3 reported 
by Kollmann (2005): the estimated standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate 
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between the U.S. and EU3 during 1973:1-1994:4 was 8.75%.   
 
Also notice that, when    rises from 0.5 to 0.8, the average levels of household 
consumption and capitalist consumption decline dramatically (    :-0.49% -2.82%, 
   
  : -0.86% -4.02%, and    
   : -2.40% -10.96%).  This reflects the fact that 
(i) the average levels of real net worth in the non-traded and export sectors (        
and        ) fall from -0.85% to -3.99% and from -2.40% to -10.95%, respectively; 
(ii) average resource costs (    ) rise from 0.48% to 2.65%; (iii) the average risk 
premium in the non-traded sector (     ) increases from 0.16% to 0.75%; and (iv) 
average actual output in the non-traded sector (   
  ) declines from -0.95% to -4.53%, 
when    rises from 0.5 to 0.8.27 
 
When   = 0.8 (nominal exchange rate volatility is 9.76%), the consumption cost is 
5.50% - which is equivalent to 5.50% of permanent consumption.  This implies that, 
when exchange rates are highly volatile, the welfare difference is very large in 
magnitude.  This result contrasts with that of Devereux et al. (2006), which shows that 
the welfare-difference between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is very small.  
For example, their model predicts that the consumption cost is 0.08% when the CPI 
rule welfare-dominates the peg under full exchange rate pass-through.  In our view, 
this is due to the fact that their model assumes the stable relationship between the 
nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate and generates extremely low 
exchange rate volatility. 
 
We now briefly review parameter estimates of    (the standard deviation of the 
forecast bias innovation,    ).  As is the case for  
 , parameter estimates of    
range widely.  For example, Taylor (1993) reports that the estimates of    for the 
U.S. and other G7 countries range from 3.7 % (the U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar) to 
                                                   
27
 Besides, when    rises from 0.5 to 0.8, average labour effort (   ) increases from -0.06% 
(column [3]) to 0.62 % (column [4] of Table 3.2.).  This is another reason why the welfare 
difference becomes wide.   
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10.1% (the U.S. dollar/deutsche mark).  Taking into account a line of empirical 
evidence that EMCs tend to be more vulnerable to shocks, especially to volatile capital 
flows, than industrialized countries (e.g., Schaechter et al., 2000),    could be greater 
than or equal to the Taylor‟s estimates (3.7%   10.1%).28  Devereux (2002) argues 
that „the estimate of Kollmann (  = 3.3%) is likely to represent a lower bound on the 
volatility of UIP shocks relevant to EMCs, given their much higher exposure to volatile 
capital flows.‟  Since it is obvious that a higher value of    makes the peg more 
desirable, we do not deal with alternative calibrations of    (as    rises, exchange 
rate volatility increases). 
 
3.4.2.  Strict domestic-inflation targeting  
 
We now compare the peg with strict domestic-inflation targeting in terms of 
welfare.  Strict domestic-inflation targeting corresponds to the interest rule when 
       in Eq. (3.46).  This subsection conducts the same simulation as in the 
previous subsection.  
 
   The results are summarized in Fig. 3.3.  Figure 3.3 plots the consumption cost 
when comparing the peg with strict domestic-inflation targeting (the dashed line) and 
that when comparing the peg with the CPI rule (the solid line).  This figure indicates 
that, when     0.68, strict domestic-inflation targeting welfare-dominates the peg 
and that strict domestic-inflation targeting outperforms the CPI rule.  The intuition for 
the results is as follows: strict domestic-inflation targeting entails perfect stabilization of 
non-traded goods inflation, which completely eliminates inefficient price dispersion 
across non-traded goods firms, that is, output loss in the non-traded sector (    =0).  
This thus helps to prevent potentially large declines in consumption („stabilization 
effects‟), thereby yielding higher welfare under strict domestic-inflation targeting when 
    0.68 (recall that, under the CPI rule, inefficient price dispersion is one of the 
                                                   
28
 McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000) choose    to be 4.0% on the basis of the study by Taylor 
(1993). 
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main reasons for the decline in consumption).  This also gives us an explanation about 
why strict domestic-inflation targeting has better welfare properties than the CPI rule.  
On the other hand, when     0.68 (exchange rate volatility is high), the peg is 
welfare-superior to strict domestic-inflation targeting.  This is mainly because adverse 
balance sheet effects overwhelm the benefits of stabilization effects.   
 
When   = 0.68 (welfare is the same for both regimes), the standard deviation of 
the nominal exchange rate under strict domestic-inflation targeting is 10.25 %.  This 
implies that highly volatile exchange rates are required for the superiority of the peg 
over strict domestic-inflation targeting, compared to the case where the peg 
welfare-dominates the CPI rule (for example, when   = 0.2, the standard deviation of 
the nominal exchange rate under the CPI rule is 3.18%: not shown in Table 3.2).
29  
 
3.4.3.  Taylor rules  
 
Next, we consider two more flexible exchange rate regimes.  More specifically, 
we compare the peg with two types of Taylor rules.  First, we analyze a classic Taylor 
rule which has the parameters    1.5,    0.5, and    0 in the following form: 
         
       
 
   
         
   
       
  
    
                                    
 
where     is a deterministic steady-state level of non-traded output.
30
  Second, we 
examine an augmented Taylor rule whereby the central bank sets    1.5,    0.5, 
and    0.5 in Eq. (3.55).
31
  The augmented Taylor rule indicates that the monetary 
                                                   
29
 Generally, strict domestic-inflation targeting tends to generate more volatile exchange rates than 
strict CPI inflation targeting (the CPI rule).  Strict domestic-inflation targeting makes the best use of 
exchange rate fluctuations in order to stabilize non-traded goods prices.  On the other hand, the CPI 
rule has to care about exchange rate fluctuations, since the CPI consists of both non-traded goods 
prices and imported goods prices. 
30
 Strictly speaking, real output (real GDP) should be incorporated into the Taylor rule.  However, 
the rule incorporating real GDP performs much worse than the interest rule as described by Eq. 
(3.55).  Therefore, we report the results when using Eq. (3.55). 
31
 We may use optimally calibrated parameters.  For example,   ,   , and    are set to the  
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authority responds directly to nominal exchange rate depreciation.  This subsection 
performs the same simulations as in subsection 3.4.1.  
 
   Figure 3.4 presents the results of the simulations.  The solid line describes the 
consumption cost when comparing the peg with the CPI rule, whereas the chained line 
[the dashed line] represents that when comparing the peg with the classic Taylor rule 
[the augmented Taylor rule].  The figure illustrates that, when the persistence of the 
forecast bias shock,   , is relatively high (or exchange rate volatility is relatively high), 
the peg is better than the classic Taylor rule in terms of welfare (once    exceeds 0.42, 
the peg welfare-dominates the classic Taylor rule).  In the comparison of the peg 
relative to the augmented Taylor rule, after    goes beyond 0.23, the peg 
welfare-dominates the augmented Taylor rule. 
 
The figure also shows that the classic Taylor rule performs much better than the CPI 
rule.  Since the classic Taylor rule reacts directly to non–traded output fluctuations 
(   0.5), the classic Taylor rule generates higher non-traded output than the CPI rule, 
thereby raising consumption relative to the CPI rule.  This implies that monetary 
policy rules which react directly to output could generate a bigger improvement in 
performance than those that do not respond directly to output.  Moreover, the figure 
indicates that the classic Taylor rule outperforms the augmented Taylor rule.  This is 
mainly because the augmented Taylor rule generates higher resource costs than the 
classic Taylor rule.  Therefore, the augmented Taylor rule reduces consumption, 
compared to the classic Taylor rule.  This suggests that adding the exchange rate into 
the Taylor rule might increase resource costs and reduce welfare.     
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
(footnote continued) 
values which maximize the conditional expectation of life time utility.  Here, following         
and Tchakarov (2007), we use the standard parameter values. 
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3.4.4.  Price stickiness  
 
We now consider an alternative calibration of the price stickiness parameter ( ).  
As discussed above, price stickiness in the non-traded sector induces output loss and 
has significant consequences for consumption.  Under the CPI rule with forecast bias 
shocks, price dispersion across non-traded goods firms increases with exchange rate 
volatility, thereby lowing consumption relative to the peg.  The experiments so far 
have calibrated   to the standard estimate used in the literature, that is,   has been 
fixed at 0.75, which implies that the average price adjustment interval is 4 quarters.  
We now choose a lower value of   and set it at 0.5, implying that the average price 
adjustment period is 2 quarters.  The objective here is to see whether the peg 
welfare-dominates the CPI rule when the degree of nominal price rigidity is lower than 
the standard estimate used in the literature.  This section conducts the same simulation 
as in subsection 3.4.1.  
 
   The results are depicted in Fig. 3.5.  This figure shows that the peg has better 
welfare properties than the CPI rule and that the consumption cost increases with   .  
The results indicate that, even if the average price adjustment interval shortens from 4 
quarters to 2 quarters, the main message of subsection 3.4.1. holds.  Comparing the 
consumption cost when   0.75 (the baseline value) with that when   0.5, as 
expected, the former is greater than the latter.  This implies that the degree of nominal 
price rigidity affects the welfare difference of the two regimes and that the peg becomes 
more desirable, the higher the degree of nominal price rigidity.  
 
3.4.5.  No financing constraint case 
 
   The simulations thus far have focused on the economy with balance sheet 
constraints.  Finally, we compare it to the economy without balance sheet constraints 
in order to investigate whether and how the presence of these constraints affects the 
welfare assessment of exchange rate regimes.  We briefly describe the model without 
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balance sheet constraints in Appendix B.2.  The model assumes that there are no 
capitalists and households accumulate physical capital without any financing 
constraints on investment.  As in the economy with balance sheet constraints, we 
assume that the forecast bias shock applies under flexible exchange rates, not under 
fixed exchange rates.  Here, we compare the peg to two types of flexible exchange 
rate regimes: the CPI rule and strict domestic-inflation targeting.   
 
   The results are depicted in Fig. 3.6.  The solid line represents the consumption cost 
for the economy with balance sheet constraints, whereas the dashed line does that for 
the economy without balance sheet constraints.  The top panel of Fig. 3.6 compares 
the peg with the CPI rule.  It shows that the same conclusion holds even when balance 
sheet constraints are not present: in the economy without balance sheet constraints, the 
peg welfare-dominates the CPI rule under plausible calibrations of   .  However, the 
welfare difference between the two regimes is much greater in the economy with 
financing constraints than in the economy without these constraints.  When the value 
of    is low, the welfare difference between the two regimes is very small in the 
economy without financing constraints (e.g., the consumption cost is 0.06% when 
       ).  As discussed in subsection 3.3.3.2., in the economy with balance sheet 
constraints, the CPI rule generates (i) more serious balance sheet deterioration and (ii) 
larger output loss in the non-traded sector, thereby lowering consumption relative to the 
peg.  On the other hand, in the economy without financing constraints, the CPI rule 
yields output loss in the non-traded sector, but does not generate balance sheet 
deterioration.  Therefore, the consumption cost is much higher in the economy with 
financing constraints.  Our results indicate that, although the presence of balance sheet 
constraints does not alter the welfare ranking of the two regimes, it affects the welfare 
difference between the two regimes, that is, it increases the welfare difference between 
both regimes.  
   
The bottom panel of Fig. 3.6 plots the consumption cost when comparing the peg to 
strict domestic-inflation targeting.  It shows that, in the economy without balance sheet 
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constraints, strict domestic-inflation targeting is welfare-superior to the peg for 
variations of    between 0.2 and 0.8.  In addition, with a growing   , the welfare 
difference between both regimes becomes larger - strict domestic-inflation targeting 
becomes more desirable.  The results contrast with that found in the economy with 
balance sheet constraints (see subsection 3.4.2.).  There are two main reasons for the 
results.  First, as discussed above, strict domestic-inflation targeting entails perfect 
stabilization of non-traded goods inflation, which completely eliminates output loss in 
the non-traded sector and thus helps to prevent potentially large declines in 
consumption („stabilization effects‟).  Another reason is that households under strict 
domestic-inflation targeting hold more foreign currency bonds in contrast to the peg 
and their stock of foreign currency bonds increases as    rises.  That is, they increase 
the stock of „precautionary savings.‟32   In the economy without balance sheet 
constraints, these two effects work in conjunction, generating higher welfare under 
strict domestic-inflation targeting.  Similarly, in the economy with balance sheet 
constraints, strict domestic-inflation targeting completely eliminates output loss in the 
non-traded sector and households under this regime hold a larger stock of foreign 
currency bonds (compared to the peg).  However, when exchange rate volatility is 
high (       ), the benefits of both stabilization effects and precautionary saving are 
more than offset by adverse balance sheet effects, thereby reducing welfare relative to 
the peg.  Our results reveal that the presence of balance sheet constraints alters the 
welfare ranking of the two regimes in the case of high exchange rate volatility.   
 
When comparing strict domestic-inflation targeting with the CPI rule in the 
economy without balance sheet constraints, Fig. 3.6 shows that the former outperforms 
the latter, as in the economy with balance sheet constraints.  As mentioned above, this 
is because strict domestic-inflation targeting completely eliminates inefficient price 
dispersion across non-traded goods firms.  Average foreign assets under the CPI rule 
are about as high as under strict domestic-inflation targeting.  However, under the CPI 
rule, the benefits of precautionary saving are more than offset by output loss due to 
                                                   
32
 See subsection 3.3.3.2. for „precautionary saving.‟ 
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inefficient price dispersion, thereby lowering consumption (and welfare) relative to 
strict domestic-inflation targeting. 
 
 
3.5.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates what type of exchange rate regime is more desirable when 
there are financial market imperfections in EMCs.  This is accomplished through a 
welfare-based comparison of a fixed exchange rate regime with several types of 
flexible exchange rate regimes in the context of a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium small open economy model which includes some characteristics of EMCs 
such as balance sheet effects in combination with foreign currency debt and 
vulnerabilities to external shocks (foreign interest rate and export price shocks). 
 
This chapter extends the model of Chapter 2 to examine how the degree of 
exchange rate volatility affects balance sheets and welfare.  The main feature of the 
extended model is to introduce an exogenous shock to the UIP condition under flexible 
exchange rates, which allows the model to generate more realistic exchange rate 
volatility.  The second-order approximation method is used to solve the model and to 
conduct a rigorous welfare evaluation of exchange rate regimes. 
 
This chapter finds that the peg is welfare-superior to the strict CPI inflation 
targeting regime (the CPI rule) under plausible calibrations of exchange rate volatility.  
In addition, as exchange rate volatility increases, the welfare difference between the two 
regimes becomes wider (the peg becomes more attractive).  Our results also show that 
whether the peg is welfare-superior to the strict domestic-inflation targeting regime or 
not depends on the degree of exchange rate volatility - the peg is more desirable in 
welfare terms when exchange rate volatility is high.  Our results provide one 
explanation for the widespread adoption of currency pegs by emerging market 
countries which suffer from excessively volatile exchange rates. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The objective of this thesis has been to study what type of exchange rate regime is 
more desirable in welfare terms when there are balance sheet constraints in emerging 
market countries (EMCs).  This was accomplished through a rigorous welfare-based 
comparison of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in the context of different 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium small open economy models which incorporate 
balance sheet effects coupled with foreign currency debt.  More specifically, this thesis 
investigated whether and how (i) the level of foreign currency debt and (ii) the degree 
of exchange rate volatility affect balance sheets and welfare under different exchange 
rate regimes. 
 
Little work in the existing literature has addressed these two questions.  Most of 
the previous studies have not investigated the welfare implications of various debt 
levels under different exchange rate regimes.  Thus, they have not provided clear 
answers to the question of what type of exchange rate regime is more suitable for 
EMCs when the level of foreign currency debt is low or high.  Regarding the second 
question, since they assume a stable relationship between the nominal exchange rate 
and the nominal interest rate, their models generate extremely low exchange rate 
volatility.  Therefore, they might understate balance sheet effects and tend to 
underestimate balance sheet vulnerabilities.  In other words, they have not investigated 
how highly volatile exchange rates affect balance sheets and welfare.  This thesis 
aimed to fill the gap in the literature. 
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Chapter 2 highlighted the effects of debt levels on balance sheets and welfare.  We 
evaluated the welfare properties of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes by 
employing a two-sector (non-traded and export sectors) model, which assumes 
staggered price setting in the non-traded sector.  Although Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
argue that many monetary authorities in EMCs are reluctant to allow their currencies to 
float freely owing to balance sheet vulnerabilities, we found that the float 
welfare-dominates the peg for a broad range of debt levels.  In addition, as the level of 
foreign currency debt rises, the welfare difference between the two regimes becomes 
larger – the float becomes more desirable.  Since by design the peg acts so as to 
contain exchange rate fluctuations completely and not to react directly to 
domestic-inflation (non-traded goods inflation), the peg generates more volatile 
domestic-inflation and hence higher price adjustment costs in the non-traded sector than 
the float.  As discussed in Chapter 2., the price adjustment cost induces output loss 
and reduces final-output in the non-traded sector.  Therefore, the peg yields lower 
final-output than the float – which lowers consumption (and welfare) relative to the 
float.  In order to check the sensitivity of the results, we conducted different robustness 
experiments and similar results were obtained. 
 
We also found that the degree of exchange rate pass-through has no effect on the 
welfare ranking of the two exchange rate regimes.  However, our results showed that 
the degree of exchange rate pass-through affects the welfare difference between the two 
regimes: the welfare difference between the two regimes is larger under low exchange 
rate pass-through than under full pass-through.  This suggests that flexible exchange 
rates are more attractive in terms of welfare, the slower exchange rate pass-through.  
Further, the two-sector model offered a useful insight into the behaviour of the 
non-traded and export sectors.  It showed that, with a large stock of foreign currency 
debt, the economic slowdown becomes more severe in the export sector than in the 
non-traded sector.   
 
   In Chapter 3, we extended the model of Chapter 2 to examine how the degree of 
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exchange rate volatility affects balance sheets and welfare.  The main feature of the 
extended model was to introduce an exogenous shock to the UIP (uncovered interest 
parity) condition under flexible exchange rates, which allows the model to generate 
more realistic exchange rate volatility.  On the other hand, we assumed that under 
fixed exchange rates the shock does not apply.  Using the extended model, we 
evaluated the welfare implications of the peg and several types of flexible exchange 
rate regimes (the strict CPI inflation targeting regime, the strict domestic-inflation 
targeting regime, etc.). 
 
The results were basically consistent with the „Fear of Floating‟ view.  We found 
that the peg welfare-dominates the strict CPI-inflation targeting regime under plausible 
calibrations of exchange rate volatility.  In addition, we showed that, when exchange 
rates are highly volatile, the welfare difference between the two regimes is very large in 
magnitude, which presents a convincing rationale for choosing the peg.  This result 
contrasts with those of previous studies.  For example, Devereux et al. (2006) report 
that the welfare difference between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is very 
small even in the presence of balance sheet effects and foreign currency debt.  In our 
view, this is due to the fact that their model assumes a stable relationship between the 
nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and generates extremely low 
exchange rate volatility.  We also found that whether the peg is welfare-superior to the 
strict domestic-inflation targeting regime or not depends on the degree of exchange rate 
volatility – the peg is more desirable in welfare terms when exchange rate volatility is 
high.   
 
Moreover, our model showed that the presence of balance sheet constraints is very 
important for the welfare assessment of exchange rate regimes.  When comparing the 
peg with strict CPI inflation targeting, we found that the presence of balance sheet 
constraints affects the welfare difference across the two regimes - that is, it increases the 
welfare difference between the two regimes -, although the presence of these 
constraints does not alter the welfare ranking of the two regimes (the peg is 
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welfare-superior to strict CPI inflation targeting in the economy with and without 
balance sheet constraints).  In the comparison of the peg relative to strict 
domestic-inflation targeting, our results revealed that the presence of balance sheet 
constraints alters the welfare ranking of the two regimes when exchange rate volatility 
is high.  In the economy without balance sheet constraints, strict domestic-inflation 
targeting welfare-dominates the peg under plausible calibrations of exchange rate 
volatility, whereas in the economy with balance sheet constraints the peg 
welfare-dominates strict domestic-inflation targeting when exchange rates are highly 
volatile (as mentioned above).   
 
   In the light of these findings, we argue that 
(i) floating exchange rates could be more desirable, the higher the level of foreign 
currency debt, and that 
(ii) fixed exchange rates could be more desirable, the higher exchange rate volatility. 
 
Interestingly, the former contrasts with the „Fear of Floating‟ view.  The „Fear of 
Floating‟ view argues that the higher the level of foreign currency debt, the greater the 
impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on balance sheets become, thus making flexible 
exchange rates less desirable.  This is because, with a large amount of foreign 
currency debt, even a small exchange rate depreciation could inflate debt servicing 
costs, which could reduce firms‟ net worth, thereby increasing balance sheet 
vulnerabilities.  However, our findings do not support this argument.     
 
   This thesis has focused only on the appropriate choice of exchange rate regime: 
which exchange rate regime is more desirable, fixed exchange rates or floating 
exchange rates?  A possible extension of this thesis is to investigate whether monetary 
authorities in EMCs should add the exchange rate into the monetary policy rule, e.g. a 
classic Taylor rule, when they implement a flexible exchange rate regime.  Although 
we briefly discussed this topic in Chapter 3, it would be possible to perform a more 
thorough welfare evaluation of monetary policy rules under flexible exchange rates.  
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In Chapter 3, we restricted our attention to the standard parameter values of Taylor rules.  
Such an extension could also allow for optimally calibrated policy parameters: the 
coefficients of Taylor rules are set to the values which maximize the conditional 
expectation of life time utility.  This would further enhance our understanding of the 
role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules for EMCs.  
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Table 2.1: Parameter calibration 
 
Symbol Value Description 
   2 Inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
   0.985 Quarterly discount factor 
   1 Elasticity of substitution between non-traded goods and 
import goods in consumption 
   11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties (same across the 
sectors) 
   1.0 Coefficient on labor in utility 
   1.0 Inverse of the elasticity of labor supply 
   0.7 Share of capital in the export sector 
   0.3 Share of capital in the non-traded sector 
   0.025 Quarterly rate of capital depreciation 
   0.55 Share of non-traded goods in the CPI 
     120 Price adjustment cost parameter in the non-traded sector 
     0 or 120 Price adjustment cost parameter in the import sector 
(      under full pass-through, while         
under delayed pass-through) 
    12 Investment adjustment cost parameter 
    0.0007 Foreign borrowing cost parameter 
   0.2 Coefficient of the monitoring cost for foreign lenders 
   0.95 Household labor share 
     0.46 Autocorrelation of the foreign interest rate shock 
    0.77 Autocorrelation of the export price shock 
     0.012 Standard deviation of the foreign interest rate shock 
    0.013 Standard deviation of the export price shock 
Source: Devereux et al. (2006). 
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Table 2.2: Welfare evaluations 
Regime Original calibration 
Full Pass-through 
(     )  
Baseline experiment  
Full Pass-through 
(     )  
Baseline experiment 
Delayed Pass-through 
(       )  
FLOAT [1] PEG [2] FLOAT [3] PEG [4] FLOAT [5] PEG [6] 
Debt- to- net worth ratio (%) 62.25 62.25 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 
       
Total expected utility -28.892 -28.926 -35.701 -35.885 -35.599 -35.885 
   of which household (-43.131) (-43.175) (-44.218) (-44.415) (-44.096) (-44.415) 
Consumption cost (   )     - 0.0769     - 0.4642     - 0.7223 
       
Means (%)       
    -0.26 -0.32 -2.49 -2.83 -2.23 -2.83 
     0.18 0.27 1.37 1.71 1.21 1.71 
      0.12 0.20 1.35 1.66 1.24 1.66 
      0.35 0.46 1.41 1.82 1.14 1.82 
    -0.03  0.00 -1.85 -1.80 -2.32 -1.80 
  Real wage (W/P ) -0.32 -0.35 -3.58 -3.89 -3.28 -3.89 
      -0.16 -0.12 -1.81 -1.87 -1.61 -1.87 
      -0.16 -0.10 -3.06 -2.89 -3.06 -2.89 
      -0.74 -0.75 -8.80 -9.61 -7.98 -9.61 
      -0.34 -0.28 -4.83 -4.73 -4.73 -4.73 
       0.10 0.11 0.82 0.92 0.75 0.92 
       0.05 0.04 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.28 
  Real exchange rate (S/P ) 0.06 0.04 0.50 0.32 0.66 0.32 
     0.14 0.36 0.45 1.19 0.12 1.19 
     - - - - 0.19 0.00 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Regime Original calibration 
Full Pass-through 
(     )  
Baseline experiment  
Full Pass-through 
(     )  
Baseline experiment 
Delayed Pass-through 
(       )  
FLOAT [1] PEG [2] FLOAT [3] PEG [4] FLOAT [5] PEG [6] 
Standard deviations (%)       
    1.45 1.53 2.23 2.35 2.09 2.35 
     1.26 1.51 2.58 3.14 1.97 3.14 
      2.55 3.22 5.83 7.14 3.99 7.14 
      4.81 5.14 8.16 8.88 7.84 8.88 
    18.16 17.42 31.64 30.43 38.28 30.43 
  Real wage (W/P ) 2.80 3.31 4.59 5.53 2.83 5.53 
      1.84 2.30 4.10 5.00 2.85 5.00 
      1.17 1.27 2.00 2.23 1.98 2.23 
      3.04 3.33 5.27 5.81 4.40 5.81 
      0.89 0.99 1.67 1.85 0.89 1.85 
       0.83 0.88 2.92 3.10 2.79 3.10 
       0.56 0.55 1.85 1.80 1.90 1.80 
  Real exchange rate (S/P ) 1.52 1.34 2.50 2.16 3.89 2.16 
     1.77 0.00 2.71 0.00 3.88 0.00 
     0.51 0.82 0.92  1.49  0.48  1.49 
Source: Author‟s calculations.  Notes: „FLOAT‟ and „PEG‟ represent strict CPI inflation targeting and the fixed exchange rate regime, respectively.  Columns [1] and 
[2] pertain to the case with a debt-to-net worth ratio of 62% under full pass-through, which is consistent with the calibration of Devereux et al. (2006).  Columns [3] and 
[4] correspond to the case with a debt- to- net worth ratio of 200% under full pass-through, while columns [5] and [6] correspond to the case with a debt-to-net worth ratio 
of 200% under delayed pass-through.  The tabulated variables coincide with those in the text and Appendix A.3.     and    refer to differences from their deterministic 
steady-state values.  The other variables are defined as percentage deviations from their deterministic steady-state values.  All statistics and the consumption cost are 
expressed in per cent, that is, they are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 3.1: Parameter calibration (Baseline parameter values) 
 
Symbol Value Description 
   0.98 Quarterly discount factor – the quarterly real interest rate 
is thus (1 - )/   
   2 Inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
   1.0 Coefficient on labor in utility 
   1.0 Inverse of the elasticity of labor supply  
   1.0 Elasticity of substitution between non-traded and 
imported goods in consumption 
   0.55 Share of non-traded goods in the CPI 
   0.3 Share of capital in the non-traded sector 
   0.7 Share of capital in the export sector 
   0.95 Household-labor share 
   0.025 Quarterly rate of capital depreciation 
    12 Investment adjustment cost parameter 
    0.0019 Bond adjustment cost parameter 
   11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties  
  0.75 Price stickiness parameter 
   0.2 Coefficient of the monitoring cost for foreign lenders 
  0.94 Capitalists‟ saving rate 
   0.5 Standard error of the idiosyncratic technology shock of 
capitalists 
    0.8 Autocorrelation of the foreign interest rate shock 
    0.86 Autocorrelation of the export price shock 
   0.5  Autocorrelation of the forecast bias shock 
    0.0023 Standard deviation of the foreign interest rate shock 
    0.019 Standard deviation of the export price shock 
   0.033 Standard deviation of the forecast bias shock 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
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Table 3.2: Welfare evaluations 
Regime Without    With   
Shocks to   ,   
  Shocks to   ,   
 ,   
PEG CPI rule CPI rule  CPI rule 
     = 0.5     = 0.8 
 [1] [2]  [3]  [4] 
Total expected utility ( a + b) -17.258 -17.199  -17.551  -19.392 
    (a) Households -32.424 -32.383  -32.473  -33.280 
    (b) Capitalists 15.166 15.184  14.922  13.888 
Consumption cost (ϵ, %) 
 
- -0.1591  0.7772  5.5012 
Means (%)       
  -0.21 -0.10  -0.49  -2.82 
  0.10 0.03  -0.06  0.62 
   -0.07 -0.07  -0.46  -1.88 
   -0.27 -0.23  -1.99  -9.39 
   -0.30 -0.15  -0.95  -4.53 
   -0.40 -0.28  -1.17  -6.77 
   -0.39 -0.30  -2.58  -12.43 
Imports -0.09 -0.03  -0.85  -4.22 
    0.04 0.02  0.16  0.75 
    0.02 0.01  0.11  0.40 
     -0.20 -0.09  -0.85  -3.99 
      -0.33 -0.21  -2.40  -10.95 
    -0.21 -0.09  -0.86  -4.02 
    -0.33 -0.21  -2.40  -10.96 
Real exchange rate (S/P ) -0.06 -0.01  0.08  0.58 
NFA 1.25 1.29  22.31  103.23 
  0.23 0.09  0.48  2.65 
       
Standard deviations (%)       
   1.59  1.51  3.22  8.18 
  1.91 1.64  2.57  5.48 
   2.09 1.62  5.15  9.40 
   1.33 1.27  3.68  8.79 
   2.64 2.26  2.87  6.22 
   1.59 1.48  1.87  4.46 
    7.28 6.27  12.21  28.09 
    4.39 4.31   8.65  17.81 
S 0.00 1.94  4.40  9.76 
Real exchange rate (S/P ) 1.61 1.79  2.32  5.81 
   0.59 0.36  0.86  2.01 
Source: Author‟s calculations.  Notes:‘PEG‟ and „CPI rule‟ represent the fixed exchange rate regime and 
the strict CPI inflation targeting regime, respectively.  Columns [1] and [2] correspond to the case 
without the forecast bias shock ( ).  Columns [3] and [4] pertain to the CPI rules when    = 0.5 and 
when     0.8, respectively.  The tabulated variables coincide with those in the text.  All statistics and 
the consumption cost are expressed in percent (that is, they are multiplied by 100). 
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Figure 2.1: Relation between the Risk Premium 
and the Leverage Ratio 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: The vertical axis shows the quarterly risk premium (%).  Figure 2.1 coincides with 
the case when the standard error of the productivity shock (    is set at 0.217.  The dashed 
line indicates a leverage ratio of 290%, which corresponds to a deterministic steady-state 
debt-to-net worth ratio of 200% in the baseline experiment. 
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Figure 2.2: Welfare Evaluations (Baseline Experiment) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,   (  is expressed in per cent, that is, it 
is multiplied by 100).  A positive value of   indicates that the flexible exchange rate regime 
is welfare-superior to the fixed exchange rate regime.  The solid line describes the 
consumption cost under full exchange rate pass-through, while the dashed line represents that 
under low pass-through.   
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Figure 2.3: Welfare Evaluations  
(Robustness to the Steady-State Risk Premium) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,   (  is expressed in per cent, that is, it 
is multiplied by 100).  A positive value of   indicates that the flexible exchange rate regime 
is welfare-superior to the fixed exchange rate regime.  The solid line describes the 
consumption cost in the baseline experiment.  The dashed line represents the consumption 
cost when the deterministic steady-state risk premiums are increased to the baseline values 
plus 100 basis points.   
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Evaluations  
(Robustness to Alternative Calibrations for  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes:   is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.  The vertical axis 
shows the consumption cost,   (  is expressed in per cent, that is, it is multiplied by 100).  
A positive value of   indicates that the flexible exchange rate regime is welfare-superior to 
the fixed exchange rate regime.  The solid line describes the consumption cost in the 
baseline experiment (   ).  The dashed line represents the consumption cost when 
     , while the chained line indicates that when    .   
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Evaluations  
(Robustness to an Alternative Method to 
Calibrate the Debt-to-Net Worth Ratio) 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes:  The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,   (  is expressed in per cent, that is, 
it is multiplied by 100).  A positive value of   indicates that the flexible exchange rate 
regime is welfare-superior to the fixed exchange rate regime.    
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Evaluations  
(Robustness to an Alternative Risk Premium Specification) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,   (  is expressed in per cent, that is, it 
is multiplied by 100).  A positive value of   indicates that the flexible exchange rate regime 
is welfare-superior to the fixed exchange rate regime.   
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Figure 3.1: Impulse response to a 1% forecast bias shock  
under the CPI rule (expressed in %) 
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Figure 3.1 (continued) 
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Source: Author‟s calculations.  Notes: Figure 3.1 depicts the dynamic responses of some 
macroeconomic aggregates to a 1% positive forecast bias shock in period 1 under the CPI rule 
(the baseline parameter values used).  The horizontal axis shows time.    denotes the forecast 
bias shock.  The responses of the macroeconomic aggregates are shown as percentage 
deviations from their deterministic steady-state values.  They are all expressed in per cent.  
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis (Alternative Calibrations for    ) 
PEG versus CPI rule 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: Figure 3.2 shows the welfare comparison of the peg with the CPI rule.  The horizontal 
axis represents the autocorrelation coefficient of the forecast bias shock,   .  The vertical axis 
shows the consumption cost,  , which is multiplied by 100 (i.e. expressed in per cent).  A 
positive value of   indicates that the peg is welfare-superior to the CPI rule, and vice versa.   
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis (Alternative Calibrations for    ) 
PEG versus Strict Domestic-Inflation Targeting & CPI rule 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: Figure 3.3 shows the welfare comparison of the peg with two flexible exchange rate 
regimes (strict domestic-inflation targeting and the CPI rule).  The horizontal axis represents the 
autocorrelation coefficient of the forecast bias shock,   .  The vertical axis shows the 
consumption cost,  , which is multiplied by 100 (i.e. expressed in per cent).  A positive value 
of   indicates that the peg is welfare-superior to strict domestic-inflation targeting (or the CPI 
rule), and vice versa.  The solid line describes the consumption cost when comparing the peg 
with the CPI rule, whereas the dashed line represents that when comparing the peg with strict 
domestic-inflation targeting. 
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis (Alternative Calibrations for    ) 
  Classic Taylor Rule 
                 PEG  versus    Augmented Taylor Rule 
CPI rule  
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes: Figure 3.4 shows the welfare comparison of the peg with three flexible exchange rate 
regimes (the classic Taylor, augmented Taylor and CPI rules).  The horizontal axis represents 
the autocorrelation coefficient of the forecast bias shock,   .  The vertical axis shows the 
consumption cost,  , which is multiplied by 100 (i.e. expressed in per cent).  A positive value 
of   indicates that the peg is welfare-superior to the float, and vice versa.  The solid line 
describes the consumption cost when comparing the peg with the CPI rule, whereas the chained 
line [the dashed line] represents the consumption cost when comparing the peg with the classic 
Taylor rule [the augmented Taylor rule]. 
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis 
(Alternative Calibrations for    and  ) 
 
PEG versus CPI rule 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Notes:   denotes the price stickiness parameter.  Figure 3.5 shows the welfare comparison of 
the peg with the CPI rule.  The horizontal axis represents the autocorrelation coefficient of the 
forecast bias shock,   .  The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,  , which is multiplied 
by 100 (i.e. expressed in per cent).  A positive value of   indicates that the peg is 
welfare-superior to the CPI rule, and vice versa.  The solid line describes the consumption cost 
when using the baseline value (      ), whereas the dashed line indicates the consumption 
cost when      . 
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis (Alternative Calibrations for   ) 
Economies with and without balance sheet constraints  
 
(i) PEG versus CPI rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) PEG versus Strict Domestic-Inflation Targeting 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations. 
Figure 3.6 compares the economy with balance sheet constraints (the solid line) to that without 
these constraints (the dashed line).  The horizontal axis represents the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the forecast bias shock,   .  The vertical axis shows the consumption cost,  , 
which is multiplied by 100 (i.e. expressed in per cent).  A positive value of   indicates that the 
peg is welfare-superior to the float, and vice versa.  The top panel compares the peg with the 
CPI rule, whereas the bottom panel compares the peg to strict domestic-inflation targeting.  
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Appendix A 
 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
 
A.1.  The optimal financial contract 
 
In this section, we focus on the derivation of the optimal financial contract 
condition in the non-traded sector.
1
  The optimal contract in the export sector is 
described in a similar way.   
 
There is a continuum of measure 1 of capitalists in the non-traded sector.  At 
the end of period t, capitalist i invests      
  units in his project.  He finances 
the project partially with his net worth,      
 , and partially with the loan from 
the foreign lender,          
       
      , where     denotes the unit price 
of capital and    is the nominal exchange rate.  The project is subject to an 
idiosyncratic productivity shock       (0, ), where ln (   )   N ( 
  
 
 
,   
 ) 
with E(ω) = 1 and the pdf of     is given by       .  The total value of the 
project is thus                  
 , where        is the real return of capital 
investment.  After his investment decision, the capitalist can observe     
without any costs, while the foreign lender has to pay monitoring costs,   times 
the value of the project (                  
 ), in order to observe    .  The 
model assumes that capitalists and foreign lenders are risk neutral. 
 
                                                   
1
 Appendix A.1. and A.2. are mainly based on the appendixes of Bernanke et al. (1999) 
and of Devereux et al. (2006). 
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   Under the conditions, the optimal contract is stipulated as follows: if     is 
greater than a cutoff value      
   (         
   ), the capitalist pays a fixed 
amount      
                
  to the foreign lender and receives the residual 
amount,           
                  
 .  On the other hand, if          
  , 
the capitalist receives nothing and the foreign lender monitors the project and 
seizes the total proceeds net of monitoring costs.  The expected yield to the 
capitalist is thus 
                      
                      
             
 
     
  
 
     
  
  
                      
        
    
 
where        
    is the expected share of the return on capital going to the 
capitalist.  The expected return to the foreign lender is written as:  
                 
       
             
 
     
  
                    
     
  
 
  
                 
       
             
 
     
  
                       
 
     
  
 
  
                 
        
    
 
where        
    is the expected share of the return on capital going to the 
foreign lender.       
                 
     
  
 
 represents the expected 
fraction of the return on capital that is used up in monitoring.  Total expected 
monitoring costs are thus      
               
 .  Since the expected return to 
the foreign lender needs be at least equal to the opportunity cost of his funds, the 
participation constraint for the foreign lender is given by 
                  
        
           
           
       
  
    
  
              
 
The left hand side of (A.1) indicates the expected return on the investment, 
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whereas the right hand side does the opportunity cost of the loan,          
  
     
     , in terms of local currency.        
  represents the risk-free rate. 
 
   The optimal contracting problem is to choose the cutoff value      
   and 
     
  in order to maximize the expected return to the capitalist  
 
                         
          
     
subject to the participation constraint (A.1). 
 
As stressed by Bernanke et al. (1999), when there is aggregate uncertainty, 
     
   will basically depend on the ex post realization of       , which makes 
the loan contract structure complicated because the capitalist has to decide the 
cutoff value      
   before the realization of       .  In order to make the 
contract structure simpler, we assume that risk-neutral capitalists bear all the 
aggregate risk, following Bernanke et al. (1999) and Devereux et al. (2006).
2
  So 
     
   will be contingent on the realized aggregate state and the participation 
constraint will hold with equality at every possible state ex post. 
 
   The first order conditions are then 
                            
     
                         
           
     
    
  
                             
 
                    
            
      
        
      
                                                                       
 
where     denotes a state of the world,      is the probability of state   
and      is the Lagrange multiplier.  Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) yields 
                                                   
2
 In                 (2004), it is assumed that the threshold      
   does not depend on 
aggregate risk. 
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Rearranging (A.4) gives 
         
                 
   
        
   
        
   
        
     
   
        
   
        
   
    
  
 
        
   
Since     is i.i.d. across capitalists, the financial contract is the same for every 
capitalist.  We thus drop the superscript i. 
  
                  
         
         
           
   
         
         
    
  
 
        
                        
 
(A.5) corresponds to Eq. (26) in Chapter 2. 
 
 
A.2.  Derivation of     ,     ,  ,      , and       
 
We assume that ln ( )   N ( 
  
 
 
,   
 ) where    is the standard error of 
the productivity shock.  Then, we have 
                    
 
 
   
where      denotes the pdf of   given by  
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As shown in subsection 2.2.5. (Chapter 2), the expected share of the return on 
capital going to capitalists,     , is given by  
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first term on the right hand side is then 
             
 
 
 
 
 
      
   
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
                       
Let         .  Using the fact that 
  
  
          , we can rewrite (A.6) 
as follows: 
                
 
 
     
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
      
 
  
  
    
                                      
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
     
         
                                      
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
     
   
                                   
 
  
      
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
            
 
    
  
  
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
     
      
  
 
 
    
                                                              
where erfc    is the complementary error function defined as 
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Analogously, the second term on the right hand side can be expressed as 
                  
 
      
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
   
                                       
 
      
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
     
 
  
  
    
                                        
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
     
   
                                    
 
  
      
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
           
 
    
  
  
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
     
      
  
 
 
    
                                                            
 
From (A.7) and (A.8), we obtain  
      
 
 
     
         
   
    
  
 
 
     
        
   
    
                       
 
   Using (A.7), we can write   (the expected fraction of the return on capital 
that is used up in monitoring) as:  
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where erf     is the error function defined as 
                
 
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
   Since              , the expected share of the return on capital 
going to the foreign lender (    ) is given by 
                                                                                                       
 
   Differentiating (A.9) with respect to   yields 
            
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
     
        
   
    
  
 
Here, we can show that  
        
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
                                                               
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, we obtain 
               
 
 
     
        
   
    
  
    
Finally, we know from (A.10) that:  
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Differentiating this equation with respect to  , we get 
                      
 
     
     
         
     
    
  
 
 
A.3.  Capitalists in the export sector 
 
Let the subscript X denote the export sector.  Eqs. (A.11) - (A.12) describe 
the optimal financial contract condition and the foreign lenders‟ participation 
constraint in the export sector, respectively:  
  
                  
         
         
           
   
         
         
    
  
 
        
                       
 
                         
       
                                                              
 
where    
  is the amount borrowed abroad at the end of period t-1: 
           
   
 
    
                      
 
The consumption of capitalists,   
  , and their net worth,      , are given by 
    
                                                                                    
 
                              
                                                   
 
It is assumed that   
   comprises the same mix as the household‟s consumption 
basket. 
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Finally, the real gross return on capital in the export sector,       , is expressed 
as 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
 
B.1.  Derivation of Eq. (3.48) 
 
Let        
                        
            
       
          
                   
It is assumed that firm i must meet all demand at the posted price (see subsection 
3.2.3).  The assumption means that supply must equal demand at the firm level:  
                               
        
  
      
   
         
Recall that       is homogeneous of degree one and that the household-labour 
capital ratio and the capitalist-labour capital ratio are identical across firms (see 
Eqs. (3.12) – (3.13)).  Integrating over all firms yields 
                   
   
   
 
   
 
   
     
   
      
   
 
   
 
   
 
where            
 
 
  ,            
 
 
  , and    
      
    
 
 
  .  This 
equation corresponds to Eq. (3.48).   
 
 
B.2.  The economy without balance sheet constraints 
 
In this section, we list the equilibrium conditions of the model without 
balance sheet constraints.  The model is mainly based on both that of Bergin et 
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al. (2007) and that of Devereux et al. (2006).  The model assumes that there are 
no capitalists and households accumulate physical capital without any financing 
constraints on investment.  The model equations are identical to those of the 
model with balance sheet constraints, with the exceptions of the representative 
consumer‟s budget constraint (B.1); the Euler equations for the determination of 
capital in the two sectors (B.5 and B.6); the production technologies in the two 
sectors (B.15 and B.26); the optimality conditions for production firms (B.11, 
B.12, B.13 and B.14); no equations related to capitalists (the absence of capitalist 
consumption, their net worth, and the risk premium).  As in the economy with 
balance sheet constraints, the forecast bias shock applies under flexible exchange 
rates, not under fixed exchange rates.  The equilibrium conditions of the model 
are described as follows: 
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